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INTRODUCTION 
Several recent high-profile cases have illustrated flaws with 
the government’s discovery practices in criminal cases and have put 
prosecutors across the country on the defensive about their compliance 
with disclosure obligations. The conviction of former Alaska Senator 
Ted Stevens on ethics charges was set aside after it was revealed that 
federal prosecutors withheld notes of an interview with a key 
government witness; one member of the Stevens prosecution team 
who was under investigation for contempt subsequently committed 
suicide.1 The Supreme Court remanded a double murder case from 
Tennessee for potential resentencing after it was revealed that state 
prosecutors had withheld substantial evidence of inconsistent 
statements made by government witnesses.2 Chemical giant W.R. 
Grace and three of its high-level executives were acquitted on criminal 
environmental charges in Montana after a federal judge gave 
blistering jury instructions criticizing the prosecution team for failing 
to disclose the depth of their relationship with a star whistleblower.3 
In each of these cases, prosecutors drew the ire of the judiciary for 
their cavalier approach to discovery and their lack of attention to the 
constitutional rights of defendants. These stories and others4 have 
made the public more attuned than ever before to the prevalence and 
pernicious consequences of prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
 1. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009) 
(order setting aside verdict); Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at 
39. 
 2. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2009). 
 3. United States v. W.R. Grace Co., CR 05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. 2009). The jury 
instructions are summarized at http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2009/July-2009/Pages/ 
Fiery-Jury-Instructions.aspx.  
 4. In response to another disclosure violation in a high-profile federal organized crime 
prosecution, then-Chief District Judge for the District of Massachusetts, Mark Wolf, initiated 
disciplinary proceedings against a prosecutor in his own court, having documented several prior 
instances of Brady violations in the District from which he concluded that the Department of 
Justice was either unable or unwilling to police prosecutors who violated their discovery 
obligations. See In re Auerhahn, 650 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2009); Shelley Murphy, Three 
Judge Panel Urged to Suspend Lawyer, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2010, at 1. Subsequently, a panel of 
three District Court judges declined to impose discipline. See In re Auerhahn, 2011 WL 4352350, 
at *13 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2011) (concluding that bar counsel failed to make out a violation of 
attorney conduct rules by the AUSA by clear and convincing evidence in organized crime 
prosecution; although prosecutor “fail[ed] to document more carefully” inconsistent statements 
that cooperating witness had made to him and investigators during debriefing and trial 
preparations sessions, and took “too casual an approach” to his discovery obligations, bar counsel 
had failed to prove “actual knowledge” by prosecutor of exculpatory evidence). 
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What do those three cases have in common? All involved so-
called “impeachment evidence,” which the prosecutor is required to 
disclose to the defendant under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments if the evidence has any reasonable 
probability of affecting the outcome of a criminal case.5 Impeachment 
is the process of challenging a witness with the objective of weakening 
or discrediting his testimony. “Impeachment evidence” is any evidence 
that can be used by the defendant—typically on cross-examination—to 
undermine the credibility of a government witness. It includes 
promises, rewards, and inducements made by the prosecution to its 
witnesses that might establish the witness’s bias in favor of the 
government; prior statements inconsistent with the witness’s trial 
testimony that could be used on cross-examination to show fabrication 
or mistake; acts or conduct showing the witness’s motive of ill will or 
hostility toward the defendant; past misconduct of the witness 
showing character for dishonesty; and medical, mental health, or 
addiction issues that might cloud the witness’s ability to perceive, 
remember, or narrate. 
Deciding whether and when to disclose impeachment evidence 
is one of the thorniest problems prosecutors face.6 The impeachment 
concept has almost limitless elasticity, and it can be difficult for 
prosecutors to assess the “materiality” of impeachment evidence 
before a trial has commenced and the parties’ strategies (and witness 
lists) have crystallized. There is also an ever-present danger that some 
impeachment material might be possessed by government agents 
investigating the case but unknown to the prosecutor.7 Finally, 
impeachment disclosures risk exposing witnesses to harassment, 
intimidation, and embarrassment before trial. Due to these problems 
and uncertainties, many prosecutors now draft plea agreements to 
require the defendant to waive disclosure of impeachment evidence 
upon a guilty plea to avoid efforts to reopen a conviction should such 
information come to light after sentencing.8 
 
 5. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
 6. See Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: 
Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2179 
(2010). 
 7. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (construing Brady v. Maryland to require 
prosecutors to “learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s 
behalf in the case, including the police”). 
 8. A typical federal plea agreement includes a waiver provision such as the following:  
The defendant understands that discovery may not have been completed in this case, 
and that there may be additional discovery to which he would have access if he elected 
to proceed to trial. The defendant agrees to waive his right to receive this additional 
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There are now serious battles looming over the disclosure of 
impeachment information that have the potential to pit prosecutors 
against bar disciplinary authorities. This issue is reminiscent of the 
controversies in the mid-1990s over then Model Rule 3.8(f) (the 
attorney subpoena rule) and Model Rule 4.2 (the no-contact rule), each 
of which raised fundamental constitutional questions regarding who 
has the power to regulate the conduct of federal prosecutors practicing 
in U.S. courts.9 Government attorneys argue that there is no 
constitutional duty to disclose impeachment evidence before trial 
unless it is “material” (that is, possibly outcome determinative)10 and 
no constitutional obligation whatsoever to disclose impeachment 
information prior to a guilty plea.11 But in 2009, the Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American 
Bar Association (“ABA”) issued a formal ethics opinion construing 
Model Rule 3.8 to impose discovery obligations on prosecutors far 
broader than those imposed by the Due Process Clause and most 
states’ rules of criminal procedure.12 If state bar disciplinary 
authorities follow the lead of the ABA and interpret their own rules of 
prosecutorial ethics in a similarly broad fashion, then they may force 
another showdown on the issue of who has the authority to regulate 
the discovery practices of this nation’s prosecutors with regard to 
impeachment material. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I review the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to date under the Due Process Clause 
with regard to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. In Part II, I 
examine the nature and scope of impeachment evidence and the 
various factual contexts in which it might arise in criminal cases. I 
argue that impeachment material presents far greater complexities 
than “classically” exculpatory evidence for the reasons the Supreme 
Court recognized but failed adequately to explain in United States v. 
Ruiz.13 In Part III, I discuss developments since the Ruiz decision—in 
 
discovery which may include, among other things, evidence tending to impeach the 
credibility of potential witnesses.  
Erica G. Franklin, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the 
Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1999). 
 9. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The 
Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 315–16 (1992); 
Rory Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 
359–67 (1996). 
 10. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
 11. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002). 
 12. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 454 (2009). 
 13. 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
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particular, (1) efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to address disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence that have gathered momentum since the Stevens dismissal 
but have been thus far successfully resisted by the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) and (2) calls to amend or interpret attorney conduct 
rules to broaden the government’s disclosure obligations. In Part IV, I 
argue that rules of criminal procedure are a far better vehicle than 
state attorney conduct rules to resolve the many competing interests 
and tensions at play with regards to impeachment evidence. Contrary 
to the positions taken by Professors McMunigal14 and Yaroshefsky,15 I 
argue that state disciplinary authorities should not follow the recent 
formal opinion of the ABA by adopting broad, burdensome, and 
inherently impractical interpretations of their professional conduct 
rules. This Part advances institutional competence and legitimacy 
arguments in favor of regulating certain questions of prosecutorial 
ethics through rules of criminal procedure rather than through rules 
of attorney conduct. In Part V, I argue that if any reform is 
undertaken, courts should adopt more specific rules of criminal 
procedure that categorize the specific types of impeachment material 
that must be turned over before a guilty plea. 
I. EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process . . . .”16 The Court likened the 
withholding of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor to the knowing 
presentation of perjured testimony, which it had previously declared 
to violate due process in Mooney v. Holohan.17 According to the Court: 
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made 
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that 
bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a 
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice . . . .18 
 
 14. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, ABA Explains Prosecutors’ Ethical Disclosure 
Duty, 24 CRIM. JUST. 41, 44 (2010); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty 
Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1025–26 (1989). 
 15. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining—What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?, 23 
CRIM. JUST. 28, 28 (2008). 
 16. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 17. Id. at 86 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). 
 18. Id. at 87–88. Although the Court’s decision in Brady referenced the prosecutor’s 
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence “on request” of the defendant, subsequent 
cases recognized that this constitutional duty of disclosure exists whether the defendant 
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The primary principle supporting the Brady holding is the 
“avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.”19 Nine years after Brady, 
the Supreme Court enlarged its construction of constitutionally 
“exculpatory” evidence to encompass impeachment evidence.20 In 
Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the government 
must disclose to the defendant any promises, rewards, or inducements 
made to a government witness in exchange for his testimony that 
would be helpful on cross-examination to show bias.21 Although Giglio 
involved a promise of immunity, subsequent cases have made clear 
that impeachment material includes more than just agreements not to 
prosecute.22 Brady, Giglio, and their progeny require a prosecutor to 
disclose to the defendant any evidence that may be used to impeach a 
key government witness on a material point of his testimony.23 The 
Supreme Court has consistently treated impeachment evidence as a 
form of “evidence favorable to the accused” subject to the Brady 
disclosure standards.24 
In determining when prosecutorial nondisclosure of 
exculpatory evidence violates due process, the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution is irrelevant.25 The Supreme Court in Kyles v. 
Whitley essentially imposed an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to 
learn of any exculpatory evidence possessed by anyone “acting on the 
government’s behalf”26 in the case, including government agents 
working on the investigative team.27 Facts known to the police will 
 
specifically requests the withheld material, only generally requests exculpatory information, or 
files no discovery requests at all. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality 
opinion). In other words, the prosecutor’s duty to turn over evidence favorable to the accused is 
self-executing; it does not depend on the presence or precision of discovery requests filed by 
defense counsel. See id. 
 19. 373 U.S. at 87. 
 20. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing Giglio for the proposition 
that exculpatory evidence includes “evidence affecting witness credibility”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263 (1999) (requiring disclosure when 
evidence is favorable to the accused, “either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching”). 
 23. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (rejecting any constitutional distinction between impeaching 
information and exculpatory evidence). 
 24. When the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence,” nondisclosure of evidence “affecting [that witness’s] credibility” falls within the 
constitutional disclosure rule announced in Brady. Id. at 677 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). 
 25. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 26. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 418, 437 (1995). 
 27. Whether an investigating agent will be considered to be a member of the “prosecution 
team” for Brady/Giglio purposes is a fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 
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thus be imputed to the prosecutor for Brady/Giglio purposes, whether 
or not the prosecutor had actual knowledge of them.28 
Brady and its progeny involved exculpatory “evidence,” 
contemplating documents or testimony that the defendant could have 
used at trial to help establish his innocence or undermine the 
government’s proof.29 Unsubstantiated tips, inadmissible hearsay, 
rumor, and innuendo favorable to the accused typically do not fall 
within the Brady disclosure rule, either because they are not 
admissible “evidence” or because they are unlikely to have led to 
evidence that could reasonably alter the trial result.30 
Evidence will be considered “material” within the meaning of 
Brady/Giglio “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”31 In Kyles, the Supreme Court clarified 
this standard, stating that evidence is material if it could “reasonably 
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.”32 The Court explained that a 
court reviewing a claim of Brady error need not decide whether the 
evidence, if disclosed, would have established innocence, but rather 
 
1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989). Not all government investigators will be considered agents of the 
prosecutor, if, for example, they work for a different sovereign or are not participating in the case 
under investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 283 (3d Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 567–68 
(5th Cir. 1979). 
 28. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438). 
 29. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 30. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (ruling that undisclosed results of 
polygraph examinations on government witnesses did not require reversal where polygraph 
evidence was inadmissible under state law and defendant’s claim that knowledge of results could 
have led to admissible evidence or altered cross-examination was based on mere speculation). 
There is no uniform approach in the federal courts to the treatment of inadmissible “information” 
as the basis for Brady claims. See generally Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 & n.7 (5th Cir. 
1999) (discussing different approaches taken by circuits and collecting cases). Some circuits and 
state supreme courts have ruled that if the withheld evidence was inadmissible, then it cannot 
be material under Brady. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 10-7456, 2010 WL 4604820 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2010); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 
1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996); Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 857 (Pa. 2005). Other circuits 
allow that inadmissible evidence can sometimes be material under Brady, if it could have led to 
the discovery of admissible evidence. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 333 F.3d 
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 31. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). In Bagley, the Court adopted a 
uniform standard of materiality to be applied to all instances of undisclosed exculpatory 
evidence, irrespective of whether the evidence withheld was specifically requested by the 
defendant, only generally requested, or not requested at all. Id. 
 32. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 
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“whether in its absence [the defendant] received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”33 
Many scholars have bemoaned the conflation of nondisclosure 
and prejudice in one test under Brady, decrying it as an unworkable 
standard and a circular spectacle.34 In order to assess whether a piece 
of evidence is constitutionally material and thus subject to mandatory 
disclosure under due process standards, the prosecutor must look 
ahead to a trial that has not happened yet and predict how an 
appellate tribunal might thereafter assess its impact on that 
proceeding.35 In other words, “Brady establishes a retrospective 
standard for establishing a prospective obligation.”36 Notwithstanding 
the conceptual difficulties inherent in this task, the Supreme Court 
continues to adhere to materiality as an essential component of the 
Brady disclosure obligation. In Strickler, the Court stated that “there 
is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so 
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 
evidence would have produced a different verdict.”37 
Difficulties in applying the Brady materiality standard in any 
predictable fashion—coupled with several high-profile instances of 
discovery lapses across the country—have led some scholars to call for 
abandonment of materiality as an element of a prosecutor’s disclosure 
obligation.38 The current rhetoric about the failures of Brady seems to 
 
 33. Id. at 434. 
 34. See Bennet L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685 
(2006); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New 
Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 564; Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional 
Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 659 (2002).  
 35. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1542 
(2010). 
 36. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L. J. 437, 516 (2001). 
 37.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); see United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 
135 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Brady does not, however, require the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory 
and impeachment material; it need disclose only material ‘that, if suppressed, would deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)). See 
generally Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 487 (2009). 
 38. See Jennifer Blasser et al., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations: Report on the Working Group of Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963 
(2010) (“The boundaries of the Brady decisions are uncertain and contested; because of the 
‘materiality’ requirement they are not capable of being easily or mechanically applied . . . .”); 
Burke, supra note 37, at 483 (arguing that after 45 years of Brady jurisprudence “the judiciary 
has failed to provide coherent guidelines to prosecutors who remain uncertain of the scope of 
their disclosure obligations,” and advocating for move to open file discovery). See generally 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699–703 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that materiality standard is 
unworkable and prosecutor should be constitutionally required to disclose all evidence favorable 
to the defendant).  
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range from two extremes: the critics who view prosecutors as zealous 
advocates willing to “gamble” by withholding evidence on a close 
materiality determination in order to win at all costs39 or the 
apologists who view prosecutors as honest but mistaken partisans 
frequently unable to recognize the materiality of exculpatory evidence 
due to their own cognitive biases, inexperience thinking from a 
defense point of view, and/or assimilation into the prosecutorial role.40 
Whichever form the discourse takes, frustrations with Brady have led 
the defense bar to look to rules of criminal procedure and attorney 
conduct rules as vehicles for imposing obligations on prosecutors to 
disclose evidence favorable to the accused beyond due process 
requirements. 
II. THE COMPLEX NATURE OF IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE 
Impeachment evidence is different from other forms of 
exculpatory evidence because it does not directly suggest that the 
defendant did not commit the crime; rather, it indirectly supports 
innocence (or failure of proof) by undermining the government’s 
affirmative evidence of guilt.41 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court treats 
evidence affecting credibility as falling within the constitutional 
disclosure rule of Brady, which is discussed above. When a key 
witness’s reliability might be determinative of guilt or innocence, 
“nondisclosure of evidence affecting that witness’s credibility” falls 
within the general rule that suppression of material favorable 
evidence by the prosecution justifies a new trial.42 
Impeachment material is any evidence having the potential to 
alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a significant 
prosecution witness.43 It may include prior statements of the witness 
that are inconsistent with his anticipated trial testimony;44 acts of 
dishonesty on the part of the witness that could be used to attack the 
witness’s character for truthfulness under Federal Rule of Evidence 
 
 39. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 4, 130–32 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007); Gershman, supra note 34, at 715–22. 
 40. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2135 
(2010); Prosser, supra note 34, at 569. 
 41. Douglass, supra note 36, at 497. 
 42. See United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972).  
 43. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 
154–55; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995); Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 124 (Va. 1996). 
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608(b) or a corollary state evidentiary rule;45 evidence that reveals 
that a witness has a bias, motive, or interest against the accused;46 
and evidence of promises made or rewards paid to a government 
witness in exchange for his cooperation and testimony.47 Some 
evidence may be both factually exculpatory and impeaching, such as a 
witness’s early identification of someone other than the defendant as 
the perpetrator or a prior inconsistent statement of the witness 
exculpating the defendant from participation in the crime.48 
To appreciate the potential elasticity of the impeachment 
concept, consider the hypothetical scenarios described below: 
Scenario 1: The alleged victim of a sexual assault gives several 
sequential interviews to a sexual assault nurse examiner, to a police 
officer, and later to the prosecutor as she prepares for grand jury 
testimony. The victim knew her alleged attacker because they had 
previously worked in the same office and the attack occurred after a 
company social event. Minor details of the victim’s story change over 
the course of several interviews, including times, a description of the 
defendant’s clothing and the words spoken by the defendant 
immediately preceding the attack. One composite report is written by 
the police officer after the details are clarified over the course of 
several interviews, although the police officer’s notes reflect some of 
the discrepancies. 
Scenario 2: The victim of a robbery at knifepoint outside an 
automated teller machine (“ATM”) later identifies his attacker from 
both a photo array and lineup. The victim was with three companions 
at the time of the attack, and each bystander also picked the 
defendant out of a photo array. One of the bystander witnesses had 
spent the earlier part of the evening at a party drinking alcohol. 
Scenario 3: Defendant is charged with bank fraud for 
overstating his assets in several commercial real estate loans that 
 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 46. See, e.g., Berry v. Oswalt, 143 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 47. See, e.g., Tassin v. Cain, 517 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2008); Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 
244 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 48. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 78–79 (1981) (vacating and remanding because 
undisclosed police report revealed victim had previously said only two of three defendants raped 
her); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291–92 (1st Cir. 2006) (affirming vacation of plea 
and sentence in organized crime prosecution where government failed to turn over recantation 
by key witness of claim that defendant had given him permission to kill one victim). As I will 
argue below, the greater includes the lesser: where evidence is both factually exculpatory and 
impeaching, it is perfectly appropriate to treat it as exculpatory for purposes of Rule 3.8(d) and 
pertinent rules of criminal procedure, and to require its disclosure prior to a guilty plea absent 
waiver. My argument in this paper addresses only evidence that is purely impeaching.  
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subsequently defaulted. The FBI agent leading the investigation has 
been accused of violating bureau policies with respect to confidential 
informants when he previously worked for the organized crime strike 
force. These allegations have not yet been substantiated or resolved, 
but the prosecutor is aware of the ongoing internal investigation. 
Scenario 4: The elderly victim of a mugging at night picked the 
defendant out of a photo array and a lineup. As the prosecutor 
prepares the victim to testify at trial, the victim appears hesitant. She 
is very nervous about testifying and states that she is not sure 
whether she will be able to identify her attacker in the courtroom. As 
she prepares to leave the prosecutor’s office, she states that she cannot 
remember where she parked her car. 
Scenario 5: After a barroom fight, defendant is charged with 
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (a beer bottle). The 
victim was hospitalized after the attack for severe contusions and 
lacerations. Responding officers interviewed several patrons at the bar 
who claim to have witnessed the argument and fight leading up to the 
alleged assault. One of the patrons tells a police officer that she “heard 
that the victim is a serious pothead.” 
Each of these scenarios presents one or more potential avenues 
for impeachment. As will be explored below, however, whether or not 
the information needs to be disclosed during discovery under 
prevailing constitutional norms is far from clear and will depend upon 
several factors; including, (1) whether the government intends to call 
the potential witness at trial; (2) how central that witness’s testimony 
is likely to be in proving an element of the government’s case in light 
of other available avenues of proof; (3) how strongly the particular 
form of impeachment is likely to undercut the witness’s credibility in 
the minds of the jury; (4) whether the impeaching information is in 
the form of admissible evidence or inadmissible hearsay; and (5) 
whether the defendant opts for a trial or decides to plead guilty. 
“Materiality” is more difficult to assess for impeachment 
evidence than it is for classically exculpatory evidence. With respect to 
the latter, the Brady standard asks the prosecutor to assess whether 
the exculpatory evidence, if made known to the jury, could have had 
any reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the trial in light 
of other evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Prudent prosecutors are 
urged to resolve doubtful cases in favor of disclosure.49 With 
impeachment evidence, however, the prosecutor’s task is far more 
nuanced. The prosecutor must first assess the centrality of the witness 
 
 49. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995). 
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to the government’s proof in light of the entire case. Then, she must 
assess what particular aspect of the witness’s testimony is likely to be 
impeached and the importance of that evidence; that is, is it a general 
form of impeachment intended to undermine the witness’s credibility 
as to all aspects of his testimony (such as a prior criminal conviction or 
promise of immunity), or is it a specific form of impeachment that will 
likely be used by the defendant to undermine the witness’s testimony 
on a particular point (such as a prior inconsistent statement)? Finally, 
the prosecutor must assess how powerfully the particular form of 
impeachment undermines the witness’s credibility. For example, a 
prior act of dishonesty twenty years old that could be used to impeach 
the witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) (such as a youthful 
indiscretion of cheating or stealing) may be less probative of credibility 
than a more recent or more serious fabrication. For these reasons, 
appellate courts assessing post-conviction claims of undisclosed 
impeachment evidence struggle with the materiality issue and often 
produce split opinions.50 If anything, their task—conducting a review 
of a completed trial record to determine if the proceedings were fair in 
 
 50. See United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2005) (majority concludes 
that testifying codefendant’s undisclosed cooperation with the government in another 
investigation was not material in the context of entire case); Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 433, 439–
42, 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (reversing grant of habeas corpus petition in state armed robbery 
prosecution where state failed to disclose police interview report with victim describing 
circumstances of attack and direction from which robbers approached; majority terms it a “close” 
and “extremely difficult” question of materiality, but ultimately concludes that defendant was 
not deprived of a fair trial; dissent concludes the report was material because it affected sole 
identifying witness’s opportunity to view his assailants); Britson v. Lewis, No. 87-2815, 1988 WL 
131765, at *6, *8 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 1988) (affirming denial of habeas corpus petition in state first 
degree murder prosecution where prosecutor failed to turn over statement which would have 
enabled defense to locate impeachment witness who could have testified to drinking with critical 
eyewitness earlier on day of murder; dissent argues that impeachment on basis of inebriation 
could have undermined testimony “fundamental to the prosecution’s case”); Garrison v. Maggio, 
540 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1976) (undisclosed supplemental police report revealed 
inconsistent statement by robbery victim about height and build of perpetrator; dissent argues it 
was material and could have created reasonable doubt); State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396, 398–99 
(La. 1980) (failure of sole eyewitness to shooting to identify defendant from earlier photo array 
was materially impeaching of in-court identification; dissent disagrees based on strength of other 
evidence in the case); State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280, 1306 (N.J. 1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting on 
issue of whether inconsistency between polygraph examiner’s oral report and written report was 
material); Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 102, 112–13 (Tenn. 1995) (majority concludes that 
evidence prisoner was paid $1000 to convince other inmate to testify against defendant not 
material within meaning of Brady, but dissent argues that fact that witness refused to speak 
with or provide any information to the state until after payment was made to a third person was 
“seriously damaging to his credibility and highly material”); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 301 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (dissenting on materiality of officer’s undisclosed notes of 
interview with key witness: “Even keeping in mind these caveats about the appropriate level of 
materiality, applying the standard to the facts of this case does not give the Court easy answers, 
as the Court candidly acknowledges.”). 
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light of all the circumstances—is easier than the task a prosecutor 
faces prior to trial before the defense attorney’s strategy and trial 
theory have been laid bare. 
Returning to the hypotheticals posed above, I suspect that most 
conscientious prosecutors would agree that the inconsistent 
statements made by the victim to the alleged acquaintance rape in 
Scenario 1 are impeachment evidence that must be disclosed under 
Brady. The real challenge for prosecutors in these situations is to 
make sure that there are mechanisms in place to capture 
inconsistencies reflected in sequential interviews because, under 
Brady, information possessed by government agents will be imputed 
to the prosecutor.51 I further suspect that there would be widespread 
disagreement over whether the impeachment information in Scenarios 
2 through 5 must be disclosed. If the government does not intend to 
call the third bystander to the ATM robbery as a witness in Scenario 
2, then his potential intoxication is irrelevant. If the hearsay rumor 
that the victim of the attack in Scenario 5 was a drug user is not based 
on first-hand knowledge, then it is not “evidence” that would likely fall 
within the Brady rule.52 Because the alleged police misconduct in 
Scenario 3 has not been substantiated, the prosecutor might not 
believe that it would be admissible to impeach the agent at trial. The 
strength of the possible impeachment with regard to the victim’s 
memory in Scenario 4 might be so slight that the prosecutor does not 
reasonably believe it would rise to the level of “material” evidence, 
especially in light of countervailing concerns for the victim’s privacy. 
While conscientious prosecutors might heed the Supreme Court’s 
admonition and “err on the side of transparency”53 by disclosing these 
four avenues of impeachment prior to trial, these very same 
prosecutors might change their calculus dramatically were the 
defendants in each case to plead guilty. 
It is these very complexities with regard to impeachment 
evidence that led the Supreme Court in 2002 to conclude that the 
Constitution does not require a prosecutor to turn over impeachment 
material before a guilty plea. Prior to Ruiz, the Supreme Court had 
 
 51. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. See discussion of Ogden Memo, infra at notes 96–103 and 
accompanying text, wherein federal prosecutors are encouraged to have agents memorialize 
witness interviews other than trial preparation sessions, and preserve their notes. See also 
Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who are not Innocents: 
Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 565–70 (2009) (recommending legislation that would require law enforcement 
officers to preserve all first drafts of informant interviews). 
 52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 53. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009). 
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never explicitly addressed the timing requirement of Brady 
disclosures.54 While the Court’s opinion in Ruiz might have confused 
that timing issue more than it helped illumine it with regard to 
“classically” exculpatory evidence,55 the Court nevertheless was quite 
clear about the low value it ascribed to impeachment evidence at the 
plea bargaining stage of a criminal proceeding. 
In Ruiz, the Court ruled that the fair trial guarantees of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment were not violated where the government 
conditioned a fast-track plea offer on the defendant’s waiver of her 
right to impeachment information.56 Writing for a unanimous court,57 
 
 54. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); United States v. Beckford, 962 F. 
Supp. 780, 785 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 690 n.2 (4th 
Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 211 (1974)). The Supreme Court in Strickler cited as justification for 
the exculpatory evidence obligation “the special role played by the American prosecutor in the 
search for truth in criminal trials.” 527 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). The language invoked by 
the Court in Kyles, Bagley, and Agurs discussing the evidence’s likely impact on the trial 
proceedings also suggests that Brady material must be disclosed prior to trial, or at least early 
enough during the trial for the defendant to make effective use of it at that proceeding. See Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 434; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1986); United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 675 (1985). Some circuits have confronted this timing issue in explicating the 
relationship between Brady and the Jencks Act, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) and 
requires federal prosecutors to turn over a witness’s statements after that witness has testified 
on direct examination. A potential conflict between the Jencks Act and Brady arises where a 
written, recorded or adopted statement of a witness contains exculpatory information, such as 
impeachment material or evidence suggesting factual innocence. Some circuits have ruled that 
where evidence is both Brady and Jencks material, disclosure after the witness has testified on 
direct examination pursuant to Jencks meets the timeliness requirement of Brady. See, e.g., 
United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d 
453, 455 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1975). Other circuits 
have ruled that the due process concerns of Brady might, under certain circumstances, require 
pretrial disclosure of Jencks Act material. See, e.g., United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 181 
n.4 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 55. See United States v. Buendo, 701 F. Supp. 937, 939–40 (D. Mass. 1988), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Penta, 923 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1990) (distinguishing classic exculpatory evidence 
from impeachment evidence). 
 56. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. It is important to recognize the unique procedural context in 
which Ruiz arose, because the Court addressed the Brady doctrine’s application to guilty pleas in 
a case that presented that issue only indirectly. Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady 
Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 663–64 (2007). In response 
to a large volume of narcotics trafficking arrests in the southwestern part of the United States, 
several United States Attorneys’ Offices in the 1990s developed a so-called “fast track” plea 
system whereby defendants waived their right to indictment, their right to file pretrial motions, 
their right to certain discovery, and their right to contest deportation proceedings in exchange for 
sentencing concessions. Ruiz was offered such a fast-track agreement upon her arrest for 
transporting thirty kilograms of marijuana into the United States, but she rejected it. She later 
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a longer period of incarceration than she would have been 
under the proposed fast track plea agreement (18 to 24 months as opposed to 12 to 18 months). 
Following her conviction, Ruiz claimed that the conditions of the fast track plea agreement were 
unconstitutional because they required her to forego her rights to Brady material, and that she 
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Justice Breyer concluded that Brady does not require the government 
to turn over impeachment evidence58 or evidence supporting possible 
affirmative defenses (e.g., insanity, self-defense, entrapment) prior to 
a guilty plea. The Court rested its reasoning primarily on concerns for 
the efficient administration of justice, determining that the costs of 
such disclosure would far outweigh its benefits to the accused.59 If 
impeachment material must be tracked down and disclosed to a 
defendant prior to a guilty plea, one of the government’s primary 
incentives for engaging in plea bargaining—disposing of cases simply 
and quickly—would be eliminated. The Court stated that such a 
construction of a defendant’s due process rights could “require the 
Government to devote substantially more resources to trial 
preparation prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving the plea-
bargaining process of its main resource-saving advantages.”60 
Moreover, the Court considered impeachment information 
particularly important “in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in 
 
should have been provided the two-level downward departure recommended by the government 
in the proposed fast-track plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling 
that a guilty plea cannot be considered knowing and voluntary if it is made without knowledge of 
Brady material withheld by the prosecutor, and that the Constitution therefore prohibits a 
waiver of the sort proposed by the government in United States v. Ruiz. 241 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court could have resolved the case by assuming without deciding that 
all forms of Brady material must be turned over prior to a guilty plea, and resting its decision 
simply on the ground that such a constitutional right, like others, could be waived by the 
defendant. But the Court did not limit its opinion to the consideration of waivability. Instead, 
Justice Breyer’s opinion addressed the disclosure obligation directly, and held that under Brady 
defendants have no constitutional right to disclosure of information relevant to either 
impeachment or affirmative defenses prior to a guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. Evidence 
supporting factual innocence was not waived or alleged to have been withheld in Ruiz, so the 
Court did not address whether a waiver of this most substantial form of exculpatory evidence 
was enforceable, or whether a plea of guilty in the face of its nondisclosure could later be 
vacated. See id. at 631. 
 57. Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment, seeming to suggest that, because Brady 
was intended to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, it may have no application whatsoever 
to a prosecutor’s discovery obligations prior to a guilty plea. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633–34 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 58. The Court reached the same conclusion with regard to evidence supporting affirmative 
defenses (e.g., insanity, self-defense, entrapment). In one short paragraph at the end of the Ruiz 
opinion, and without undertaking a separate analysis of just how probative affirmative defense 
evidence may be of innocence or the costs/benefits of mandating its disclosure prior to a guilty 
plea, the Court equated affirmative defense evidence with impeachment evidence, and concluded 
that the two should be treated similarly for the purposes of due process clause analysis. Id. at 
633. Discussion of a prosecutor’s ethical obligations with regard to affirmative defense evidence 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
 59. Id. at 631. 
 60. Id. at 632. 
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respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”61 Since the Court has never 
created a constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, during 
plea negotiations the prosecutor has no constitutional duty to disclose 
incriminating evidence to the accused (although she may have every 
strategic incentive to do so to encourage a plea).62 Because disclosure 
of inculpatory evidence is not constitutionally mandated, the Court 
reasoned that it made little sense to impose a constitutional duty on 
the prosecutor to disclose evidence that tends to undercut such 
affirmative proof.63 The value of impeachment information to 
defendants during plea negotiations varies with their awareness of the 
prosecutor’s case in chief, which the Court characterized as “random” 
and not a matter of constitutional concern.64 Finally, the Court felt 
that imposing a duty to disclose impeachment material prior to a 
guilty plea could reveal the identity of informants and undercover 
agents and jeopardize the physical safety and security of other 
potential witnesses who might be subject to tampering or 
intimidation. These risks had already been addressed by Congress 
through the carefully drawn witness statement disclosure 
requirements of the Jenks Act, which mandates the disclosure of 
certain witness statements only after the witness has testified on 
direct examination.65 
Whether and how much of the Brady doctrine survives Ruiz in 
the context of guilty pleas remains uncertain. It is abundantly clear 
that the Supreme Court has severely restricted Brady’s role in preplea 
discovery,66 if it did not eliminate it altogether.67 There remains a 
narrow opening for the Court to rule that due process requires a 
prosecutor to disclose evidence supporting factual innocence prior to a 
guilty plea or that an express waiver of such evidence as a legal 
matter cannot possibly be knowing and voluntary due to the centrality 
 
 61. Id. at 629 (internal parenthetical omitted). 
 62. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1997). 
 63. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629, 633. 
 64. Id. at 623. 
 65. Id. at 631–32. 
 66. McMunigal, supra note 56, at 664. 
 67. Whether the Supreme Court will develop any future theory to require preplea 
disclosures of evidence bearing on factual innocence remains to be seen. It has certainly left open 
the possibility of ruling that Brady is merely a trial right and does not apply at all to the plea 
bargaining context. Some circuits since Ruiz have ruled that Brady is a trial right and that even 
evidence that supports factual innocence need not be disclosed prior to a change of plea, 
reminiscent of Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Ruiz. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 
174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1502 (2010); see also United States v. Mathur, 
624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (dictum); United States v. Moussauoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (dictum). 
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of such information to the defendant’s exercise of volition.68 With 
regard to impeachment information, however, the Court was clear and 
spoke with one voice: due process does not require its disclosure by the 
prosecution prior to a guilty plea, irrespective of materiality and 
irrespective of the presence or absence of an express waiver. 
III. POST-RUIZ DEVELOPMENTS: REACTION BEGETS COUNTER-
REACTION 
When the Constitution fails, try legislation.69 Since Ruiz, 
members of the profession who believe that more fulsome disclosures 
will enhance the fairness and accuracy of guilty pleas have shifted 
their lobbying efforts toward bar disciplinary authorities and the 
drafters of rules of criminal procedure.70 The DOJ has strategically 
forestalled efforts to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure by issuing a series of pointed directives providing guidance 
to federal prosecutors about their discovery obligations and, in limited 
circumstances, by requiring disclosure slightly beyond the 
requirements of Brady. But the Department has not made any 
significant concessions on impeachment evidence. An impasse seems 
imminent, if not already at hand. Now the ABA Standing Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has stepped into the fray to 
propose a broad new interpretation of Model Rule 3.8(d) that has 
significant implications for discovery in the guilty plea context. Each 
of these developments will be discussed in turn. 
A. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
Efforts by the trial bar to amend Rule 1671 began very soon 
after the Ruiz decision. In 2003 the American College of Trial Lawyers 
 
 68. Some federal courts after Ruiz have allowed defendants to challenge the voluntariness 
of their guilty pleas based on the failure of the government to disclose evidence supporting 
factual innocence. See Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that failure to disclose evidence may be sufficiently outrageous to constitute the conduct that is 
needed to ground a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea); United States v. Lestrick, 82 F. 
App’x 4, 6 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (“[U]nder certain limited circumstances, the 
prosecution's violation of Brady can render a defendant’s plea involuntary.”) (quoting United 
States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 69. See Barry Tarlow, Brady/Giglio Disclosures: Beware of Prosecutors Bearing Gifts, 30 
CHAMPION 60, 70 (2006). 
 70. See McMunigal, supra note 56, at 670. 
 71. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as presently written, does not 
mention exculpatory evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Indeed, the primary focus of the Rule is on 
disclosure to the accused of inculpatory evidence intended to be relied on by the government at 
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(“ACTL”) proposed modifying Rule 16 to impose a duty on the 
government to disclose any “information favorable to the defendant” 
within fourteen days of request by the accused.72 The ACTL proposal 
would also have created a requirement of due diligence by the 
prosecutor in collecting favorable information from government 
agents. A corresponding amendment to Rule 11 would have required 
any favorable information subject to disclosure under Rule 16(f) to be 
disclosed to the defendant fourteen days prior to a guilty plea. The 
combined effect of these amendments would have been to dispense 
with the materiality element of Brady and to reverse the effect of Ruiz 
in terms of disclosure of impeachment evidence and evidence 
supporting affirmative defenses before a change of plea.73 The scope of 
impeachment information that would be subject to preplea disclosure 
under the ACTL proposal was thus incredibly broad. ACTL’s proposal 
never received the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules.74 
In 2006 a second proposal to amend Rule 16 made it out of the 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules and onto the agenda of the 
Standing Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure for the U.S. 
Judicial Conference. By an 8–4 vote, the Advisory Committee on 
September 5, 2006, recommended requiring federal prosecutors in 
criminal cases to disclose to the defense upon request “all exculpatory 
and impeaching information.”75 The effect of this amendment would 
have been to require prosecutors to turn over all exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence without regard to materiality, absent waiver 
by the defendant or a protective order of the court.76 However, the 
 
trial and thus “material to preparing the defense” of the accused. See id. Specific evidence 
mandated for disclosure by the government upon the request of the defendant under Rule 16 
includes written or recorded statements of the defendant; the substance of oral statements of the 
defendant made to government agents upon interrogation; the defendant’s prior criminal record; 
documents, objects and tangible things the government intends to use at trial in its case in chief, 
reports of physical examinations and scientific tests; and, a written summary of expected expert 
testimony. Id. Unlike discovery rules in many states, Rule 16 does not require federal 
prosecutors to turn over a witness list prior to trial. Id. Congress has required the government to 
disclose its list of witnesses before trial only in capital cases. See 18 U.SC. § 3432 (2006). 
 72. American College of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable 
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 95 
(2004). 
 73. See id. at 115–16. 
 74. Yaroshefsky, supra note 15, at 28. 
 75. See Stephen Spivack, David Roth & Daniel Golden, Troubling the Heavens: The 
Production of Evidence Favorable to Defendants by the United States, 30 CHAMPION 24 (2010). 
 76. LAUREL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 23 (May 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/bradyma2.pdf/$file/bradyma2.pdf. 
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proposed amendment effectively preserved the result in Ruiz by 
authorizing the withholding of impeachment material, at least where 
the defendant pleaded guilty well in advance of the scheduled trial 
date. The second sentence of the 2006 proposal provided that “[t]he 
court may not order disclosure of impeachment information earlier 
than 14 days before trial.”77 Notwithstanding this limitation, the DOJ 
strongly opposed the amendment to Rule 16 because it would extend 
disclosure requirements beyond Brady and create conflicts between 
Rule 16 and the Jencks Act.78 The Department argued instead that 
modifications to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual might help clarify and 
bring uniformity to federal prosecutors’ discovery practices across the 
country.79 The Standing Committee took no action on the Advisory 
Committee’s 2006 recommendation, deciding to not publish it for 
public comment and to table further consideration indefinitely.80 
In truth, the amendments to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual that 
successfully forestalled rules reform in 2006 did very little to alter 
prevailing practice with respect to the disclosure of impeachment 
evidence. First, the Manual is advisory only and creates no 
enforceable rights in federal court.81 But more importantly, what it 
purports to give with one hand (the promotion of disclosures beyond 
Brady), it takes away with the other. The Manual claims to require 
disclosures beyond those constitutionally mandated in three respects: 
(1) by requiring disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment 
“information,” regardless of whether such information is in the form of 
admissible evidence;82 (2) by requiring disclosure of such information 
“regardless of whether it is intended to make the difference between 
conviction and acquittal of the defendant for a charged crime”;83 and 
(3) with regard to classically exculpatory information, by requiring 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 6. See discussion supra note 54 and infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 79. Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633 (2011). 
 80. SUMMARY OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 29–30 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Reports/ST09-2007.pdf. The Standing Committee deferred further consideration of the 
proposed amendment in part based on its desire “to obtain information about the experience with 
the Department of Justice's recent revisions to its U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.” Id. at 29. 
 81. See Spivack, Roth & Golden, supra note 75, at 25 n.22 and cases cited. See also U.S. 
ATT’YS’ MAN. § 9-5.001(F) (“This expanded disclosure policy, however, does not create a general 
right of discovery in criminal cases. Nor does it provide defendants with any additional rights or 
remedies.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/ 
5mcrm.htm. 
 82. U.S. ATT’YS’ MAN., supra note 81, § 9-5.001(C)(3). 
 83. § 9-5.001(C)(1), (2). 
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disclosure “reasonably promptly after it is discovered.”84 On the 
subject of impeachment information,85 however, the policy takes a very 
curious turn. Having ostensibly abandoned materiality as a 
consideration for federal prosecutors with the language cited above, 
the Manual later reintroduces concepts of materiality with regard to 
impeachment information by suggesting that a prosecutor should 
disclose the following: information that casts “substantial doubt upon 
the accuracy of any evidence . . . the prosecutor intends to rely on to 
prove an element of any crime” and information that “might have a 
significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.”86 
These italicized words clearly indicate some threshold level of 
importance or likely causal impact.87 Moreover, with regard to the 
timing of impeachment disclosures, the Manual recognizes that what 
constitutes impeachment evidence depends on the prosecutor’s 
decision “on who is or may be called as a government witness,” so that 
disclosure of this category of information may be made closer to trial, 
at trial, or even in camera, if the interests of witness security or 
national security so require.88 As a practical matter, therefore, the 
revisions to the Manual make very few changes to discovery with 
regard to disclosure of impeachment information; they certainly do not 
either abandon a materiality element altogether or upset the Ruiz 
determination that impeachment evidence need not be turned over 
prior to a guilty plea.89 
 
 84. § 9-5.001(D)(1). 
 85. The preface to section 9-5.100 states that “[t]he exact parameters of potential 
impeachment information are not easily determined” but “may include . . . (a) specific instances 
of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking the witness’ credibility or character for 
truthfulness; (b) evidence in the form of opinion or reputation as to a witness’ character for 
truthfulness; (c) prior inconsistent statements; and (d) information that may be used to suggest a 
witness is biased.” § 9-5.100. 
 86. §9-5.001(C)(2) (emphasis added). 
 87. In fact, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual unapologetically reintroduces concepts of 
materiality after purporting to abandon them in the immediately preceding sentence. See § 9-
5.001(C) (“This policy requires disclosure by prosecutors of information beyond which is 
‘material’ to guilt . . . . The policy recognizes, however, that a trial should not involve 
consideration of information, which is irrelevant or not significantly probative of the issues 
before the court and should not involve spurious issues or arguments which serve to direct the 
pretrial process from examining the genuine issues. Information that goes only to such matters 
does not advance the purpose of a trial and thus in not subject to disclosure.” (citations omitted)). 
 88. See § 9-5.001(D)(2) (citing Jencks Act); § 9-5.001(A) (citing Classified Information 
Procedures Act). 
 89. Arguably, the flow of information from investigative agents to the prosecutor was 
improved somewhat by section 9-5.001, which requires any law enforcement agency within the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide impeachment material to Assistant U.S. Attorneys, to 
appoint a designated supervisor to receive requests for impeachment material, and to establish a 
system for collecting and producing it. § 9-5.001.  
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On the heels of the dismissal of the Stevens case in 2009, the 
presiding judge in that case, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, wrote a letter 
to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules trying to breathe new 
life into proposals to amend Rule 16. Citing the history of high-profile 
Brady violations in federal court and the Supreme Court’s admonition 
that “the prudent prosecutor [should] err on the side of transparency, 
resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,”90 Judge Sullivan 
called for amending Rule 16 to require disclosure of “all exculpatory 
and impeachment information” to the defense without regard to 
materiality and irrespective of any specific request from the accused.91 
Unlike the 2006 proposed amendment, the effect of Judge Sullivan’s 
proposal, if enacted, would have been to require disclosure of all 
impeachment evidence known to the government before a guilty 
plea,92 unless expressly waived by the defendant. In October 2009 
Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the Criminal Division Lanny 
Breuer addressed the Committee and indicated that, although the 
DOJ would not object to amending Rule 16 to codify the government’s 
Brady obligations, it objected strenuously to any proposed amendment 
of the rule that would extend Brady as to either scope (e.g., 
materiality) or timing.93 
At least partly in an effort to blunt the momentum for Rule 16 
reform spurred by the Stevens dismissal,94 in 2009 Attorney General 
Eric Holder appointed a task force of experienced prosecutors, 
investigative agents, and information technology professionals from 
the DOJ to study discovery practices in federal criminal cases.95 
Following this study, on January 4, 2010, Deputy Attorney General 
David Ogden issued an updated directive to federal prosecutors 
addressing their disclosure obligations (hereinafter the “Ogden 
 
 90. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009). 
 91. Letter from Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan to Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Judicial 
Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/exhibit-b---judge-sullivan-letter.pdf. 
 92. It is clear from the context of Judge Sullivan’s April 2010 letter that he uses the term 
“exculpatory evidence” in its broad sense to include impeachment evidence, because he quotes a 
section from the transcript of the hearing to set aside the Steven’s verdict in which the 
prosecutor acknowledges that the failure to turn over a variance in the statement of government 
witness Bill Allen was Giglio material. See id. and discussion infra note 277 and accompanying 
text.  
 93. Joe Palazzolo, Justice Department Opposes Expanded Brady Rule, MAIN JUSTICE (Oct. 
15, 2009, 12:43 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/10/15/justice-department-opposes-
expanded-brady-rule/. 
 94. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163, 171 (D. Mass. 2009) (describing “ardent 
and successful” efforts by Department of Justice to defeat proposed amendments to Rule 16).  
 95. Podgor, supra note 79, at 1. 
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Memo”).96 The Ogden Memo was intended to “establish a methodical 
approach to consideration of discovery obligations . . . to avoid lapses 
that can result in consequences adverse to the Department’s pursuit of 
justice.”97 Although it reiterates the DOJ’s previously stated policy in 
the 2006 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual revisions that disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence should be broader than due process safeguards,98 
the primary focus of the directive is on better training and supervision 
of prosecutors.99 Its sole real innovations are (1) to call on discovery 
coordinators in each U.S. Attorney’s Office to conduct annual training 
and serve as on-location advisors for trial attorneys;100 (2) to direct 
individual prosecutors to be vigilant in gathering and reviewing 
potentially discoverable information from the files of investigative 
agencies, including emails and handwritten notes of agents;101 and (3) 
to provide a useful checklist for line attorneys of potentially 
discoverable information.102 The Ogden Memo certainly breaks no new 
ground with respect to the timing or scope of impeachment 
disclosures103 or the ability of prosecutors to seek waivers of such 
discovery as a condition of a plea agreement.104 On the contrary, the 
Memo lists a number of “countervailing” considerations that might 
justify federal prosecutors’ departure from the Memo’s stated 
presumption of “broad and early” discovery, including protecting 
victims and witnesses from intimidation or harassment, protecting the 
 
 96. The “Ogden Memo” is actually a series of three memoranda issued by Deputy Attorney 
General Ogden on the same day: a “Summary” of actions taken in response to the report of the 
working group, a “Directive” to all United States Attorneys and Heads of Department Litigating 
Components Handling Criminal Matters, and a “Memorandum for Department Prosecutors.” See 
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Dep’t Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010) 
[hereinafter Summary of Actions Memo] (regarding “Issuance of Guidance and Summary of 
Actions Taken in Response to the Report of the [DOJ] Criminal Discovery and Case Management 
Working Group”), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.pdf; Memorandum from 
David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Litigating Components and all U.S. Att’ys 
(Jan. 4, 2010) (regarding “Requirement for Office Discovery Policies in Criminal Matters”), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-to-usas-component-heads.pdf; Memorandum from 
David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Dep’t Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Main Memo] 
(regarding “Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery”), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.pdf. 
 97. Main Memo, supra note 96, at 1. 
 98. Id. at 7. 
 99. See Green, supra note 6, at 2163. 
 100. See Main Memo, supra note 96, at 9; Summary of Actions Memo, supra note 96, at 3.  
 101. Main Memo, supra note 96, at 4–6. 
 102. Id. at 3–7. 
 103. As a further example of how the DOJ continues to adhere to a materiality standard for 
impeachment disclosures, see id. at 7–8, where prosecutors are urged to memorialize and turn 
over “material variances” in a witness’s statement. 
 104. Podgor, supra note 79, at 12. 
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privacy interests of witnesses, protecting privileged information, 
protecting the integrity of ongoing investigations, and protecting 
national security interests.105 
It appears that the DOJ’s focus on heightened training and 
clarified discovery policies may once again have been successful at 
forestalling Rule 16 reform. At its April 11–12, 2011, meeting in 
Portland, Oregon, the Advisory Committee considered a “discussion 
draft” of a proposed amendment to Rule 16 prepared by its Chair, 
Judge Richard C. Tallman of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.106 
The draft would have required prosecutors to turn over all 
“exculpatory” information to the defense at least fourteen days before 
trial and all “impeachment” information to the defense at least seven 
days before trial.107 Exculpatory information was defined as any 
information “inconsistent with any element of any crime charged 
against the defendant or that establishes a recognized affirmative 
defense,” significantly excluding any materiality element.108 
Impeachment information was defined as information “that casts 
substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any witness testimony that the 
government intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime 
charged.”109 The discussion draft gave prosecutors the unreviewable 
option to withhold discovery if they filed an ex parte affidavit under 
seal explaining why the government believed in good faith that such 
pretrial disclosure would “threaten the safety of witnesses, victims, or 
the public; jeopardize national security; or lead to obstruction of 
justice.”110 Notwithstanding the presence of this escape valve, 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer once again filed a letter 
with the Advisory Committee opposing the discussion draft.111 
Breuer’s primary objections in this letter were that the Department’s 
“comprehensive steps” to improve discovery practices within the 
Department had already “resulted in dramatic and positive change”;112 
that “expanding the scope of required prosecutorial disclosure” was 
 
 105. Main Memo, supra note 96, at 9. 
 106. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, AGENDA BOOK, APR. 11–12, 2001 MEETING, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Agenda 
%20Books/Criminal/CR2011-04.pdf. [hereinafter “AGENDA BOOK”]. 
 107. Memorandum from Hon. Richard C. Tallman to Criminal Rules Advisory Comm. (Mar. 
25, 2011), in AGENDA BOOK, supra note 106, tab III.C, at 6. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 7. 
 111. Letter from Lanny Breuer to Hon. Richard Tallman (Mar. 18, 2011), in AGENDA BOOK, 
supra note 106, tab III.C, at 5. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
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the wrong approach to ensuring that prosecutors meet their current 
constitutional disclosure obligations;113 and that the definition of 
impeachment information “would require decades of litigation to 
clarify what categories . . . meet the new definition.”114 Once again, the 
potential elasticity of the impeachment concept seemed to be a 
primary sticking point for the DOJ: Breuer argued that the new rule 
would “create tremendous uncertainty” and “expose witnesses to 
greater intrusions into their safety and privacy.”115 After a spirited 
and contentious meeting, the Advisory Committee voted 6–5 not to go 
forward with any proposed amendment to Rule 16 this year.116 
Given that over fifty percent of federal judges and ninety 
percent of defense attorneys recently surveyed by the Federal Judicial 
Center favor some form of codification of the government’s 
Brady/Giglio obligations,117 the temporary defeat of Rule 16 reform at 
the national level will likely lead to efforts by individual federal 
district courts to modify their local criminal rules. Meanwhile, 
advocates for enhanced Brady disclosures have begun to focus their 
attention on attorney conduct rules and the professional responsibility 
of prosecutors.118 
B. ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) 
Most states have enacted attorney conduct rules fashioned 
after ABA Model Rule 3.8(d),119 which requires prosecutors to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defense. On its face, the “tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused” language of Rule 3.8(d)120 provides little 
 
 113. Id. at 5. 
 114. Id. at 9. 
 115. Id. at 6–7. 
 116. David Markus, When Liberty is at Risk, Fair Disclosure Required, DAILY BUS. REV., May 
2, 2011, www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubarticleDBR.jsp?id=1202492322147&hbxlogin=1#. 
 117. Mike Scarcella, Divided on Discovery, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011. 
 118. Norman L. Reimer, Federal Discovery Reform: DOJ’s Baby Steps are Inadequate, 34 
CHAMPION 7, 8 (2010) (“Considering that the Ogden memoranda are unlikely to produce tangible 
change, the defense bar should look beyond the narrow contours of Brady and pursue the ethics 
route to obtain discovery.”). 
 119. Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009). A chart showing states that have adopted the Model Rules 
may be found at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html. 
 120. Rule 3.8(d) provides that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall “make timely disclosure 
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the 
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, 
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983). 
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helpful guidance on the pressing issue of whether and how much 
impeachment information must be turned over to a defendant prior to 
a guilty plea. The Supreme Court has twice suggested that Rule 3.8 
may impose disclosure obligations on prosecutors broader than due 
process protections, although it has never precisely articulated how.121 
In July 2009 the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility (hereinafter “Standing Committee”) stepped into this 
controversy and created a firestorm by issuing a bold and 
controversial opinion that could have serious implications for the 
timing and scope of impeachment disclosures. 
In Formal Opinion 09-454, the Standing Committee stated 
explicitly that Model Rule 3.8 was intended to extend discovery 
obligations on prosecutors beyond constitutional requirements set 
forth by Brady and its progeny.122 The Standing Committee then went 
on to discuss four important respects in which the ethical rule is 
broader than constitutional norms.  
First, the Standing Committee stated that, unlike Brady, Rule 
3.8 contains no materiality element.123 Exculpatory evidence must be 
disclosed to the defendant whether or not it has a reasonable 
probability of affecting the outcome of the case. 
Nothing in the rule suggests a de minimis exception to the prosecutor’s disclosure duty 
where, for example, the prosecutor believes that the information has only a minimal 
tendency to negate the defendant’s guilt, or the favorable evidence is highly 
unreliable.124 
The Standing Committee based this determination not on the text of 
the rule itself, but rather on the history of the rule’s enactment. This 
argument from the rulemaking history is particularly unconvincing. 
Imposing a special duty on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory 
evidence dates as far back as the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, 
which in 1908 contained the following provision: “The suppression of 
facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence 
 
 121. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) (“Although the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material 
evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly 
under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations.”) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 
(1995) (“[T]he rule in Bagley . . . requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to 
exculpate or mitigate.”)). 
 122. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 at 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 09-454]. 
 123. Id. at 4–5. 
 124. Id. at 5. 
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of the accused is highly reprehensible.”125 The words “capable of 
establishing” clearly denote some threshold of level of materiality, 
such as likelihood of influencing the proceedings. With the adoption of 
the Model Code in 1969, the ABA changed this language to the “tends 
to negate guilt” standard (now also found in Model Rule 3.8(d)).126 
Although the Committee suggests that “experts” at the time of the 
Model Code’s enactment were of the opinion that DR 7-103 imposed 
obligations beyond the due process standard, the Standing Committee 
cites only one such “expert.”127 Moreover, the Standing Committee 
suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Agurs128 somehow provides support for the proposition that Rule 3.8(d) 
contains no materiality element.129 It is certainly true that Agurs—
decided seven years after the enactment of DR 7-103 and later 
repudiated by Bagley—imposed a heavy burden on the defendant in 
the absence of a specific request to show that the withheld evidence 
created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.130 While some 
lower courts following Agurs and preceding Bagley imposed a 
harmless error standard when dealing with withheld evidence that 
was specifically requested by the defendant,131 the comment to Model 
Code 7-103(B) was modified following the Agurs decision to reiterate 
that materiality remained an element of the prosecutor’s ethical 
duty.132 Irrespective of how the materiality element morphed from 
Brady through Agurs to Bagley, this history does nothing to 
undermine the proposition that materiality was considered an 
 
125. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 5, available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf (emphasis added) 
(noting that the Preamble and Canons 1 through 32 were first adopted August 27, 1908). 
 126. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (B). 
 127. See ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 3 n.12 (citing Olavi Maru, ANN. CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 330 (Am. B. Found. 1979) (“[A] disparity exists between the 
prosecutor’s disclosure duty as a matter of law and the prosecutor’s duty as a matter of ethics.”)). 
 128. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 129. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 4 n.12 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. 97). 
 130. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 113. Nine years after Agurs, the Court in Bagley determined 
that the defendant bears the burden of proving that undisclosed evidence was material, 
irrespective of whether the undisclosed evidence was subject to a specific request, only a general 
request, or not request at all. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See also 
discussion supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 131. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1982). 
 132. Distinguishing Agurs, the ABA in 1979 added a comment to DR 7-103(B) stating that 
the ethical rule does not impose “a restrictive view” of materiality. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-103(B) cmt. (1980) (emphasis added). Imposing a less restrictive view of 
materiality than set forth in the Agurs decision is something quite different than imposing no 
materiality standard whatsoever. 
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essential part of the due process obligation in 1963133 and was 
retained in some fashion in DR 7-103, adopted six years later. I am 
thus not nearly as confident as the Standing Committee that the 
“background and history” of Rule 3.8(d) reveal an intent to dispense 
with materiality considerations altogether, especially since the 
drafters of DR 7-103 and Rule 3.8(d) used the phrase “tends to negate 
guilt,” which is very similar to language that appears in the Brady 
opinion itself. 
Second, the Standing Committee concluded that Rule 3.8(d) 
requires “timely” disclosure to the accused, which the Committee 
equated with “as soon as reasonably practical,” and certainly in time 
for the defense attorney to make reasonable use of the evidence or 
information, including for use in plea negotiations.134 Reasoning that 
“among the most significant purposes for which disclosure must be 
made under Rule 3.8(d) is to enable defense counsel to advise the 
defendant regarding whether to plead guilty,”135 the Committee 
concluded: 
Because the defendant’s decision may be strongly influenced by defense counsel’s 
evaluation of the strength of the prosecution’s case, timely disclosure requires the 
prosecutor to disclose evidence and information covered by Rule 3.8(d) prior to a guilty 
plea proceeding, which may occur concurrently with the defendant’s arraignment.136 
This section of the opinion suggests that a prosecutor who withholds 
impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea may be subject to 
professional discipline, even though she clearly is not violating 
constitutional safeguards after Ruiz. 
Third, the Standing Committee concluded that Rule 3.8(d) 
requires the disclosure of evidence “or information” that tends to 
negate guilt while the Brady decision only arguably requires 
disclosure of exculpatory “evidence.”137 In Formal Opinion 09-454 the 
Standing Committee determined that 
[the] ethical duty of disclosure is not limited to admissible “evidence,” such as physical 
and documentary evidence, and transcripts of favorable testimony; it also requires 
disclosure of favorable “information.” Though possibly inadmissible itself, favorable 
 
 133. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 134. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 6. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 137. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See discussion supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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information may lead a defendant’s lawyer to admissible testimony or other evidence or 
assist him in other ways, such as in plea negotiations.138 
As discussed above, this construction of Rule 3.8(d) exceeds the 
duty imposed on prosecutors under Brady, which has been interpreted 
by some lower courts to apply only to admissible evidence. 
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly for the purposes of our 
present discussion, the Standing Committee discussed Ruiz and 
opined that Rule 3.8(d), unlike constitutional guarantees, is not 
waivable by the defendant as part of a plea agreement.139 “A 
defendant’s consent does not absolve a prosecutor of the duty imposed 
by Rule 3.8(d) and, therefore, a prosecutor may not solicit, accept, or 
rely on the defendant’s consent.”140 The Standing Committee reasoned 
that Rule 3.8 (unlike other attorney conduct rules such as prohibitions 
on conflicts of interest141 or disclosure of client confidences142) does not 
specifically mention the consent of the defendant or his counsel.143 
Absent an express exception, a “third party may not typically absolve 
a lawyer of their [sic] duty to comply with ethical obligations.”144 The 
Standing Committee concluded that one of the primary purposes of 
Rule 3.8’s disclosure requirement is to promote the public’s interest in 
the reliability and accuracy of criminal proceedings; quality 
representation at the plea bargaining stage would be undermined by 
the allowance of a waiver of Rule 3.8(d) because defense counsel would 
not have access to the information they need to advise and represent 
their clients effectively.145  
The Standing Committee’s very cursory two-paragraph 
discussion of waiver in Formal Opinion 09-454 suffers from two 
principal flaws. First, Rule 3.8(d) pertains to the disclosure of 
evidence. The Standing Committee’s conclusion (unsupported by any 
citation or authority) that a prosecutor may not “solicit or accept” a 
waiver of access to exculpatory evidence is clearly wrong: nothing in 
the text of the rule prohibits a prosecutor from including waiver 
language in a plea agreement, presuming there is no subsequent 
 
 138. ABA Formal Opinion 09-454, supra note 122, at 5. 
 139. Id. at 7. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).  
 142. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983). 
 143. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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withholding of evidence in reliance on that waiver.146 More 
fundamentally, the text of the rule explicitly allows for nondisclosure 
of evidence upon approval of a tribunal.147 Where a court accepts a 
plea agreement containing a waiver provision during a Rule 11 
colloquy148 and advises the defendant about the rights he is foregoing 
under the agreement (including, if applicable, the right to further 
discovery), this functionally relieves the prosecutor of her obligations 
under the rule. 
In one critical respect, the Standing Committee interpreted 
Model Rule 3.8(d) to be narrower than the constitutional disclosure 
rule. As discussed above, the Due Process Clause requires disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence in the possession of anyone “acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case,”149 including police and other 
investigative agents. The text of Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of 
evidence “known to the prosecutor.”150 The Standing Committee 
interpreted this phrase to require “actual knowledge,” although they 
recognized that knowledge “may be inferred from the circumstances” 
and that a prosecutor “cannot ignore the obvious.”151 This latter 
language slightly objectifies what otherwise appears to be an explicitly 
subjective standard. For example, a prosecutor might be generally 
aware that certain impeachment evidence about an informant exists 
in the hands of police or agents without knowing its precise scope or 
contours. A prosecutor might also have general knowledge of the 
existence of impeachment evidence about a victim from the victim’s 
involvement in prior cases or discussions with other prosecutors, but 
this information might not have been documented and might have 
faded from the prosecutor’s memory. Both of these forms of knowledge 
would apparently suffice to trigger disclosure obligations (or at least 
further inquiry) under Rule 3.8(d) as interpreted by the Standing 
Committee.152 
 
 146. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c) (1983) (“Prosecutor in a criminal case 
shall . . . not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial 
rights.”). 
 147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983). 
 148. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (requiring parties to disclose any existing plea agreement 
when defendant offers a change of plea); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)–(5) (circumstances under 
which court may accept or reject agreement). 
 149. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
 150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983). 
 151. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7 (citing Model Rule 1.0(f) and Model Rule 
1.13 cmt. 3). 
 152. See id. at 6 (“If the prosecutor has not yet reviewed voluminous files or obtained all 
police files, however, Rule 3.8 does not require the prosecutor to review or request such files 
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The Standing Committee was clearly anxious to distinguish the 
requirements of Model Rule 3.8(d) from the Supreme Court’s Brady 
jurisprudence with regard to timing and materiality. In doing so, 
however, it waded into a hornets’ nest with perhaps unintended 
consequences by failing to explicitly distinguish impeachment 
evidence from other forms of exculpatory evidence and by foreclosing 
the possibility of waiver. The reasoning of Formal Opinion 09-454 is 
thus misguided and flawed in several important respects. The opinion 
suggests that prosecutors may be subjected to bar discipline if they 
fail to disclose to the defense any favorable evidence in their 
possession before a guilty plea, no matter how de minimis or 
inconsequential it may be and no matter what waivers are agreed to 
by the defendant as part of the plea arrangement. Needless to say, it 
has sent a chill down the spine of the prosecutorial community. 
Perhaps to garner enough votes to reach its preferred 
conclusions, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility sidestepped any explicit conclusion about impeachment 
information. It did so in a very strategic fashion, by crafting a 
hypothetical to frame its opinion that dealt only with evidence that 
was “classically” exculpatory in the sense that it directly supported 
the innocence of the accused.153 But there is no reason to believe that 
the same conclusions it reached regarding the materiality and timing 
of disclosures of exculpatory evidence would not also apply to 
impeachment information. First, impeachment evidence is a subset of 
evidence “favorable to the accused,” as the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized.154 The Standing Committee admitted as much 
in footnote 6, when it cited two impeachment cases for the proposition 
that state disciplinary authorities sometimes discipline prosecutors for 
Brady violations.155 Even more ominously, in discussing the 
nonwaivability of Rule 3.8(d) and addressing the Ruiz decision’s 
 
unless the prosecutor actually knows or infers from the circumstances, or it is obvious, that 
the files contain favorable evidence or information.”) (emphasis added). 
 153. The hypothetical the Committee used to frame its opinion involved two bystander 
witnesses to an armed robbery who viewed a line-up in which the accused was a participant and 
told police officers that “they did not see the perpetrator,” and a confidential informant’s tip to 
law enforcement that someone other than the accused committed the offense. Both are examples 
of evidence or information supporting factual innocence. Id. at 1. 
 154. See supra notes 23–24. 
 155. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 3 n.6 (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Wrenn, 790 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 2003) (prosecutor failed to disclose at pretrial hearing 
results of DNA tests in child sexual abuse case that were favorable to defendant and fact that 
that victim had changed his story); In re Grant, 541 S.E.2d 540, 540 (S.C. 2001) (prosecutor 
failed to fully disclose exculpatory material and impeachment evidence regarding statements 
given by state's key witness in murder prosecution)). 
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characterization of impeachment information as less critical to the 
accused at the plea bargaining stage of a criminal proceeding than at 
trial, the Committee stated that “[i]n any event, even if courts were to 
hold that the right to favorable evidence may be entirely waived for 
constitutional purposes, the ethical obligations established by Rule 
3.8(d) are not coextensive with the prosecutor’s constitutional duties of 
disclosure . . . .”156 These two sections of the Formal Opinion strongly 
suggest an intention to apply its conclusions to impeachment 
information, even if the Committee lacked the political will to say so 
directly. 
It is too early to tell whether and to what extent state bar 
authorities will interpret their own disciplinary rules consistently 
with ABA Opinion 09-454. So far, two states (California and Ohio) 
have shown explicit hostility to its reasoning.157 Yet defense counsel 
are already using the opinion very aggressively in an effort to obtain 
more preplea discovery, particularly in federal court.158 
 
 
 156. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7 n.33. 
 157. In September 2010 the California State Bar Board of Governors approved sixty-seven 
new professional conduct rules for consideration by the California Supreme Court, as part of an 
ongoing effort to modernize that state’s attorney conduct rules and bring them more in line with 
the ABA Model Rules. One of the main points of controversy during its September meeting was 
“how broadly or narrowly to frame the prosecutor’s ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.” Joan C. Rogers, In Its Final Look at Full Set of Updates, California Bar Endorses Last 
Seven Rules, 26 LAWYERS’ MAN. PROF’L CONDUCT 619, 620 (2010). In light of California 
prosecutors’ fierce opposition to the language and reasoning of ABA Ethics Opinion 09-454, the 
Committee decided to forego the highly general “timely disclosure of evidence or information that 
tends to negate guilt” language of ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) and replace it with the more specific 
and narrower requirement that prosecutors comply with “all constitutional obligations, as 
interpreted by relevant case law.” Id. at 621. In February 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected 
arguments that state disciplinary rule 7-103 imposes an ethical obligation on prosecutors to 
disclose impeachment information before a guilty plea, without explicitly referencing ABA 
Formal Opinion 09-454. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 
2010) (findingdisciplinary obligation no more extensive than legal obligation). Prior to the 
release of ABA Formal Opinion 09-454, two jurisdictions had already interpreted their 
disciplinary rules to contain a materiality element, contrary to the ABA Ethics Committee’s 
analysis. See In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1167, 1173 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (requiring both 
materiality and intentional failure to disclose for violation of Colo. Rules Prof’l Conduct 3.8(d), 
and defining the requisite intent as “conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result”); see also D.C. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“[Rule 3.8] is not intended either to 
restrict or to expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from the United States Constitution, 
federal or District of Columbia statutes, and court rules of procedure.”). 
 158. Irwin H. Schwartz, Beyond Brady: Using Model Rule 3.8(d) in Federal Court for 
Discovery of Exculpatory Information, 34 CHAMPION 34, 35 (2010); see, e.g., United States v. 
Colacurcio, No. CR-09-209TAJ, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2010); United States v. Kott, No. 07-
00056 (D. Alaska Oct. 23, 2009). 
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IV. WHO SHOULD REGULATE THE CONDUCT OF PROSECUTORS WITH 
REGARD TO PREPLEA IMPEACHMENT DISCLOSURES, AND HOW? 
In the coming months it is likely that many federal district 
courts will be debating amendments to their local criminal rules, and 
state supreme courts will be debating whether to adopt the ABA’s 
broad construction of Model Rule 3.8(d). In both arenas, a focal point 
of controversy is likely to be the preplea disclosure of impeachment 
evidence. The crux of that debate is twofold: (1) Are attorney conduct 
rules or rules of criminal procedure the better vehicle to regulate a 
prosecutor’s preplea discovery obligations?; and (2) How much 
impeachment evidence should a prosecutor be required to disclose 
before a guilty plea? In this Part, I will turn my attention to these two 
questions. The first, I submit, is a question of institutional competence 
and the second is a question of fundamental fairness. 
A. Institutional Competence 
Attorney conduct rules are a very poor vehicle to convey and 
enforce prosecutors’ preplea disclosure obligations. Prosecutors are 
seldom disciplined for failing to turn over material exculpatory 
evidence prior to trial, even where the misconduct has been identified 
by an appellate court upon reversal of a criminal conviction159 and 
even where the misconduct is intentional.160 Many commentators have 
identified and criticized the reluctance of bar disciplinary authorities 
to enforce Rule 3.8(d), speculating that their reticence results from 
lack of expertise,161 reluctance to interfere with the executive branch, 
 
 159. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations, 
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 731 (1987); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of 
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 744–45 (2001) (a survey of 100 bar discipline complaints 
against prosecutors found very few sanctions for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; and 
when discipline was imposed this misconduct was usually coupled with other infractions such as 
presenting false evidence or lying to the court); see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, 
Regulating Federal Prosecutors Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 398 (2002) (“[D]isciplinary 
authorities do not appear particularly eager to bring actions against prosecutors except in 
situations involving unambiguously wrongful conduct.”). 
 160. Medwed, supra note 35, at 1546–47 (2010) (citing “glaring example of disciplinary 
inaction” in California with regard to Tulare County prosecutor). 
 161. According to the California Bar Journal, there were 4,741 public disciplinary actions 
taken against that state’s attorneys in the twelve years between 1997 and 2009, and only six of 
those cases involved conduct by prosecutors in handling criminal cases. See Kathleen M. Ridolfi 
& Maurice Possley, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN 
CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, at 54 (Oct. 2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ 
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a belief that courts are better situated to enforce discovery through 
the rules of criminal procedure, and the political power of law 
enforcement.162 If bar disciplinary authorities are hesitant to 
investigate and prosecute instances of discovery abuse in the trial 
context, then they will be even more hesitant to do so in the guilty 
plea context, where the defendant has admitted his guilt and where a 
lengthy and expensive adversarial process has not been subverted by a 
prosecutor’s missteps. Moreover, recent studies show that 
prosecutors—and particularly state prosecutors—seem to be 
unaffected by the rules of professional conduct.163 Adding a toothless 
standard to Rule 3.8(d)—or worse yet, a toothless interpretation of an 
already highly generalized ethical norm164—is unlikely to have any 
impact on a prosecutor’s discovery practices prior to a guilty plea.165 If 
such a professional conduct rule has any signaling function at all, then 
it may signal that ethical norms are out of touch with the realities of 
criminal practice.166 
I do not claim that state bar disciplinary authorities lack the 
authority to regulate preplea impeachment disclosures. Ethical rules 
may and sometimes do impose obligations on attorneys above and 
beyond the Constitution or rules of civil and criminal procedure.167 
 
ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_online%20version.pdf. This statistic suggests that the staff 
of bar disciplinary agencies may not have sufficient experience with criminal matters to handle 
complex issues involving the materiality of impeachment information. 
 162. See Peter Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 427; Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to 
Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 292–93 (2004). 
 163. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on 
Prosecutorial Disclosure (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author); see Blasser et 
al., supra note 38, at 1996 (“Rules have limited influence, particularly where the compliance 
infrastructure related to the rule is weak.”); Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1146 (2005) (suggesting 
that “the prudent prosecutor is unconcerned about an ethical violation. . . . [H]e has never heard 
of a prosecutor being disciplined for his exercise of discretion in withholding evidence.”). 
 164. See ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, and related discussion. 
 165. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 977–83 (2009) (arguing that tougher disciplinary rules generally are not 
going to be effective at changing prosecutorial behavior because they will not necessarily lead to 
increased enforcement, and advocating for solutions based on corporate stakeholder strategies to 
increase accountability of each office). 
 166. See W. Bradley Wendel, Non-Legal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in 
Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1957 (2001) (“A fairly stable consensus now 
seems to exist in the legal ethics literature that rules of ‘ethics’ stated in the form of enforceable 
penal codes, have limited utility to remedy many of the observed problems with the professional 
conduct of lawyers.”). 
 167. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to interpret 
DR 7-104 as coextensive with the Sixth Amendment because the Model Code of Professional 
 
07b. Cassidy Article_Page (Do Not Delete) 11/1/2011 11:22 AM 
1462 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:5:1429 
Rule 3.8(d) could be amended (or interpreted in its commentary) to 
require prosecutors to disclose impeaching information prior to a 
guilty plea, and these state rules could certainly be applied to state 
prosecutors. Whether such regulations could be applied to federal 
prosecutors is a much closer question. Although federal prosecutors 
are bound by the state ethical rules in the jurisdictions in which they 
practice,168 there is a convincing argument that the Citizens 
Protection Act (commonly known as the McDade Amendment) would 
prevent state bar disciplinary authorities from applying such a broad 
construction of Rule 3.8(d) to federal prosecutors operating within 
their jurisdictions. This is because, as discussed below, it would 
conflict not only with Ruiz but also with the Jencks Act and several 
local district court rules.169 
My point is that a broad construction of Rule 3.8(d) that 
requires preplea impeachment disclosures would be ineffectual and 
inappropriate. It would be ineffectual because a prosecutor is unlikely 
to heed such an interpretation with regard to impeachment material 
in the face of a directly contrary ruling by the Supreme Court under 
the Due Process Clause, and a disciplinary board is unlikely to bring 
any enforcement actions where the defendant has waived trial and 
pleaded guilty. It would be inappropriate because such a detailed and 
specific rule regarding the contours and timing of impeachment 
disclosures is really a rule of discovery masquerading as a rule of 
professional responsibility. Rather than conduct having a negative 
 
Responsibility is “designed to safeguard the integrity of the profession” and therefore “secures 
protections not contemplated by the Constitution”). 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006). 
 169. See Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (in 
addressing whether local federal rule adopting 3.8(f) and constraining subpoenas to defense 
attorneys violated rulemaking power of district court, the court concluded that the McDade 
Amendment did not render issue moot: the regulations pursuant to 530B “dispel the notion that 
§ 530B grants states or local federal district courts the power, in the guise of regulating ethics, to 
impose strictures [on federal prosecutors] that are inconsistent with federal law”); United States 
v. Syling, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192–93 (D. Haw. 2008) (holding that state ethics rule could not 
be applied to impose a duty on federal prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury). 
The second paragraph of the McDade Amendment provides that “the Attorney General shall 
make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to assure compliance with this section.” 28 
U.S.C. § 530B(b). The Attorney General has implemented a regulation under the Act providing 
that “[§] 530B requires Department attorneys to comply with state and local federal court rules 
of professional responsibility, but should not be construed in any way to alter federal substantive, 
procedural, or evidentiary law or to interfere with the Attorney General's authority to send 
Department attorneys into any court in the United States.” 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b) (emphasis added); 
see Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (explaining that 
state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes); Green & 
Zacharias, supra note 159, at 414 (arguing that 530B(b) is a grant by Congress to the DOJ of 
power to preempt state ethical rules). 
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impact on a particular cause of action, attorney conduct rules typically 
focus on conduct exhibiting an affront to the court, conduct exhibiting 
unfitness to practice law generally, or conduct “recognized by 
consensus within the bar as inappropriate.”170 
Even if one considers the disclosure of impeachment 
information to implicate the “ethics” of a prosecutor, attorney conduct 
rules are not the sole or even the dominant source of norms with 
regard to litigation ethics.171 Rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and 
the court’s inherent supervisory authority are also sources of ethical 
guidance for litigators, and these standards complement and 
sometimes supplement each other.172 Other scholars have noted the 
limitations of ethical rules in the context of civil litigation and have 
recommended greater attention to procedural and evidentiary rules as 
a way to monitor controversial attorney behavior.173 Moreover, ethical 
rules and rules of criminal procedure derive from different 
perspectives; the former are driven largely by recommendations from 
the bar with very little public input, while the latter are driven 
primarily by the judiciary, subject to public comment and, in many 
jurisdictions, legislative approval.174 If, as the ABA Standing 
Committee opined in Formal Opinion 09-454, the preplea disclosure of 
exculpatory information serves primarily to promote “the public’s 
interest in the fairness and reliability of the criminal justice 
 
 170. See United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing 
factors court should look to in deciding whether rule is one of ethics or procedure for purposes of 
McDade Amendment). 
 171. See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in 
Federal Court, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 22 (2005) (explaining collapse of effort to create uniform rules 
of attorney conduct in federal court). 
 172. Id. at 10. 
 173. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules 
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1217–19 (1995) (arguing that ethical rules alone will 
not promote just settlements in class actions, and that courts need to undertake more 
substantive review of settlement processes and outcomes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). A 
distinguished panel on the subject of spoliation of e-discovery at Duke Law School recently 
concluded that the rules of civil procedure are the appropriate vehicle to address the 
preservation of electronic records and consequences for failing to do so. Thomas Y. Allman, 
Preservation Rulemaking after the 2010 Litigation Conference, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 225 
(2010); see Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-
Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010). 
 174. See Benjamin H. Barton, Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should 
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV 1167, 1205–08 
(2003) (concluding that when enacting professional conduct rules, state supreme courts may be 
too susceptible to the lawyer lobby and too inaccessible to the public); see also LAFAVE, ISRAEL, 
KING & KERR, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.7(f) (some state constitutions give authority over 
criminal rulemaking directly to the judiciary, while other states follow the model of the Rules 
Enabling Act and consider it a delegation of authority from legislative branch). 
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system,”175 then regulating such disclosures should be undertaken by 
the stakeholder with the greatest expertise in the matter and in a 
fashion that permits the most public involvement. 
Rules of criminal procedure are a far more promising vehicle 
for regulation of prosecutors with regard to preplea impeachment 
disclosures for at least three reasons. First, the courts are accustomed 
to regulating discovery in criminal cases and resolving competing 
tensions with regard to fairness, efficiency, and witness privacy. 
Second, the rules of criminal procedure tend to be enacted at a more 
granular level of specificity than attorney conduct rules, which are 
typically written in highly generalized terms.176 Third, the courts have 
a broader array of case-based sanctions available to them for discovery 
violations, such as exclusion of evidence, contempt, fines, attorney fee 
awards, adverse jury instructions, and, if extreme prejudice could be 
shown, possibly dismissal of an indictment.177 This arsenal of case-
based sanctions is far more likely to be effective in motivating 
prosecutors to be fastidious about their discovery obligations than the 
unlikely threat of a private or public reprimand from a bar 
disciplinary board long after a criminal case has concluded. They are 
also more closely aimed at remedying the harm to the defendant 
caused by the prosecutor’s conduct. 
Even where attorney conduct rules overlap with rules of 
criminal procedure in spheres of mutual influence, bar disciplinary 
authorities tend to defer to a trial court’s prerogative to enforce 
discovery obligations in the context of live pending cases. The decision 
of the Colorado Supreme Court in In the Matter of Attorney C178 is 
instructive on the relative institutional competence of trial courts and 
bar disciplinary authorities. The respondent was an assistant district 
 
 175. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 122, at 7. 
 176. See Christina Parajon, Discovery Audits: Model Rule 3.8(d) and the Prosecutor’s Duty to 
Disclose, 119 YALE L.J. 1339, 1143–44 (2010) (“[V]agueness inhibits the implementation of the 
Model Rule, a process that is demonstrably incomplete. Research indicates that local disciplinary 
authorities are generally reluctant to find and sanction 3.8(d) violations . . . .”); Prosser, supra 
note 34, at 603–608 (arguing that specific articulation of disclosure obligations through new and 
more detailed rules of criminal procedure would make nondisclosure based on ignorance less 
likely and would provide greater guidance to prosecutors). 
 177. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(D) (authorizing court to enter any sanction for 
noncompliance “that is just under the circumstances”); see also United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. 
Supp. 2d 1289, 1292–93 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (awarding attorney fees to defense counsel under Hyde 
Amendment following acquittal for discovery violations); United States v. W.R. Grace, CR 05-07-
M-DWM (D. Mont. 2009) (adverse jury instruction). See generally United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 
754, 766–67 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing inherent supervisory powers of the federal courts); United 
States v. Jones, 620 F.Supp.2d 163, 178–80 (D. Mass. 2009) (same). 
 178. In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002). 
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attorney charged with misconduct for failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence before preliminary hearings in two different criminal 
matters. The hearing board found that the respondent violated 
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) in both cases—
negligently in the first and knowingly in the second—and 
recommended a public reprimand.179 The Colorado Supreme Court 
reversed, ruling for the first time that their state version of Rule 3.8(d) 
incorporated both a materiality element and a mens rea of intent. 
Construing the “timely” component of the rule to require disclosure 
before the next critical stage of the criminal proceeding, the court held 
that the “rule was unclear” before its application to the respondent 
and therefore respondent could not have had an intent to withhold 
evidence in contravention of the ethical mandate.180 In ruling for the 
respondent, the court took a very dim view of the efficacy of 
professional discipline in the area of criminal discovery: 
[D]iscovery issues arise in almost every criminal case. Trial courts routinely make 
findings of fact and enter orders and sanctions designed to respond to the severity of the 
violation . . . . Not only is management, regulation, and supervision of discovery 
preeminently a trial court function . . . but we also have case law and rules of procedure 
specifically tailored to redress any discovery violations. We neither wish to upset that 
process nor to interject regulatory counsel into it.181 
While perhaps extraordinary in terms of its candor, the In re 
Attorney C case reflects the view that the attorney grievance system is 
“ill-suited to address[] any but the most serious discovery violations”182 
in criminal cases. The North Carolina version of ABA Model Rule 
3.8(d) explicitly recognizes the superior competence of courts in this 
area by requiring prosecutors to “make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information required to be disclosed by 
applicable law, rules of procedure, or court opinions including all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.”183 
B. Fundamental Fairness 
 Should the rules of criminal procedure attempt to undo in any 
fashion the effect of Ruiz? Today’s dominant justification for plea 
bargaining is the so-called “trial shadow” theory—plea bargaining is 
 
 179. Id. at 1173. 
 180. Id. at 1174. 
 181. Id. at 1173–74. 
 182. Id. at 1174. 
 183. N.C. State Bar Rules, ch. 2, Rule 3.8(d) (emphasis added). 
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the product of both parties’ rational forecast of the likely sentence 
after trial, discounted by the risk of conviction/acquittal and the costs 
to the party of going forward.184 Within the trial shadow framework, 
arguments in favor of broader preplea disclosure essentially proceed 
on two levels: voluntariness and accuracy.185 
According to the voluntariness argument,186 enhanced 
impeachment disclosures will help make sure the guilty plea process 
more closely mirrors trial outcomes by promoting the defendant’s 
informed assessment of the strength of the government’s case and the 
likelihood of conviction following trial. The problem with the 
voluntariness argument is that it proves too much. The absence of 
impeachment evidence is just one form of information deficit that a 
defendant faces when he pleads guilty. A defendant may not know 
whether the government’s evidence will be suppressed, whether key 
witnesses will show up for trial, whether the victim will be able to 
make an in-court identification, whether the judge will consider the 
evidence at trial sufficient to warrant a particular jury instruction 
favorable to the defense (e.g., self-defense, entrapment), whether the 
government will survive a directed verdict and make it tactically 
necessary for the defendant to take the stand, and so forth.187 What 
separates discovery questions from other forms of trial uncertainty is 
that in the former situation the information is known to the 
government but not to the defendant, whereas in the latter situation 
 
 184. Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 73, 77 (2009); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1948 (1992). 
 185. Yaroshefsky, supra note 15, at 31–32 (arguing for enhanced disclosures prior to guilty 
plea to promote voluntariness and accuracy). 
 186. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to 
Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2040–42 (2000) (arguing that 
Brady disclosure insures the voluntariness of guilty pleas, promotes factual accuracy, and 
encourages meaningful consent); Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 952 (2008) (“Lack of information about impeachment or exculpatory 
evidence exacerbates the inequity of the plea process because without access to this information, 
defendants have no leverage to obtain pleas that accurately reflect the strength of the 
government’s case against them.”). 
 187. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (upholding a guilty plea against 
later attack on grounds that it was not voluntary: “We find no requirement in the Constitution . . 
. that a defendant must be permitted to disown his solemn admissions in open court that he 
committed the act with which he is charged simply because it later develops that the state would 
have had a weaker case than the defendant had thought.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 (1970) (plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice of counsel not open to later 
attack on the ground that counsel have misjudged admissibility of confession: “All the pertinent 
facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court . . . . 
In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best 
judgment as to the weight of the State’s case.”). 
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both parties labor under the same uncertainty. But if by “voluntary 
and intelligent”188 we mean autonomous as opposed to fully informed, 
the government’s state of mind (knowing information and failing to 
disclose it) cannot convert an otherwise volitional act on the part of 
the defendant into an involuntary one. Both parties possess 
information at the time of a guilty plea unshared with the other. The 
prosecutor may have more experience trying cases before the trial 
judge than the defense attorney and have greater insights into her 
likely rulings; the prosecutor might have tried several other cases 
with a particular police officer as a witness and know that she will not 
fare particularly well on cross-examination; and the prosecutor may 
know that the victim is terminally ill and unlikely to live until the 
time of trial. No plausible construction of due process or Model Rule 
3.8(d) would suggest that any of that information needs to be shared 
with a defendant before his sworn admission of guilt before a judge 
will be considered “voluntary.” The critical value of impeachment 
information lies in its function to help prepare a trial attorney to 
cross-examine adverse witnesses.189 Since by pleading guilty the 
defendant is specifically waiving the right to confront the witnesses 
against him,190 it is particularly difficult to argue that this form of 
information deficit (i.e., what ammunition he might use on cross-
examination and to what effect) is any more troubling than many 
other uncertainties faced by a defendant. 
Other scholars have argued that enhanced discovery before a 
plea bargain will help promote the “accuracy” of guilty pleas.191 For 
example, Professor McMunigal’s accuracy argument proceeds as 
follows. Innocent defendants sometimes may not know whether they 
are guilty due to cognitive impediments present at the time of the 
event, but they nevertheless may plead guilty to avoid harsh 
sentencing consequences following trial. For example, youth, mental 
infirmity, or intoxication may all render a suspect incapable of 
assessing accurately the factual circumstances leading up to the 
 
 188. Under Supreme Court precedent a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent if the 
defendant (1) is aware of the essential nature of the charges against him, (2) is advised by 
competent counsel, and (3) is not induced to plea by threats, inducements, or improper promises. 
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. 
 189. See Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal 
Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 472 
(1998). 
 190. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 191. McMunigal, supra note 14, at 968; McMunigal, supra note 56, at 660; Prosser, supra 
note 34, at 549, 560.  
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alleged offense.192 Disclosure of impeachment information prior to a 
guilty plea to defendants who actually do not know whether they are 
guilty will help such defendants better understand their chances of 
acquittal following trial and reduce the incidence of inaccurate 
outcomes. 
The accuracy problem should certainly cause us more pause 
than the voluntariness concern. There may be rare situations193 where 
an accused does not remember the incident with sufficient clarity to 
make an honest assessment of his legal responsibility.194 But the 
critical question is whether those situations are common enough to 
warrant a major resource commitment to enhanced preplea 
discovery.195 A solemn admission in open court by the defendant 
during allocution that he committed the offense is entitled to great 
deference;196 this presumption of regularity should not be disturbed 
merely because we can imagine a situation where the defendant is 
unsure whether he committed the offense but is willing to say that he 
did in order to gain the benefits of a favorable plea bargain. Moreover, 
the same defendants under Professor McMunigal’s scenario who are 
handicapped in assessing their own conduct are also handicapped in 
assessing the strength of the inculpatory evidence against them (e.g., 
 
 192. McMunigal, supra note 14, at 968; McMunigal, supra note 56, at 657–58.  
 193. Professor McMunigal concedes that it is “undoubtedly true in most cases” that a 
criminal defendant knows whether he or she committed the offense charged. McMunigal, supra 
note 56, at 657. 
 194. Professor McMunigal envisions a situation where a defendant charged with motor 
vehicle homicide who blacked out and lost control of her car in a rainstorm might not be in a 
position to have observed the circumstances leading up the accident, and therefore might not be 
in a good position to challenge the conclusions of an accident reconstruction expert that she was 
grossly exceeding the speed limit. Id. at 659. In the hypothetical raised by Professor McMunigal, 
that state expert is subject to impeachment on a number of grounds not disclosed prior to the 
guilty plea. See id. 
 195. See United States. v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“Our procedure has been 
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.”). Although 
criticism certainly may be leveled at Judge Hand’s cynical observation in Garsson, especially in 
light of modern technology’s ability to help exonerate those wrongfully convicted by a jury after 
trial, our moral concern about the incidence of false conviction is justifiably less where the 
defendant admits his guilt before a judge under oath. 
 196. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“[D]efendants advised by 
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are . . . unlikely to be driven to 
false self-condemnation.”); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (“[A] 
counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and 
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case.”); see also United 
States. v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676–77 (1997) (“Given the great care with which pleas are taken 
under [the] revised Rule 11, there is no reason to view pleas so taken as merely ‘tentative,’ 
subject to withdrawal before sentence whenever the government cannot establish prejudice.” 
(quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee’s note) (alteration in original)). 
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the physical presence of purported eyewitnesses, their proximity to 
the event in question, the circumstances under which forensic or other 
evidence was gathered from the defendant at the scene, etc.). As the 
court implied in Ruiz, unless we are prepared to say that full 
disclosure of inculpatory evidence is a precondition to a knowing and 
intelligent guilty plea, any rule that requires disclosure of 
impeachment evidence would benefit defendants with more 
independent knowledge about the incident in question over the 
cognitively handicapped defendants that Professor McMunigal seeks 
to protect.197 
The accuracy argument is also flawed because it proceeds as if 
the prosecutor were the only relevant actor in plea negotiations. If a 
defense attorney confronts a client who suffers cognitive impediments 
that could limit the client’s ability to comprehend whether or not he 
committed the alleged offense, that attorney has a duty to investigate 
the case more thoroughly than otherwise before counseling a guilty 
plea.198 Certainly impeachment material is more accessible to the 
government than to the defense, especially in federal court where the 
prosecutor is not required to provide the accused with a list of 
witnesses. But in cases where the client is mentally, emotionally, or 
cognitively impaired, defense attorneys may counsel their clients to 
refuse to sign plea agreements containing waivers of access to 
impeachment information and wait until fuller discovery is provided 
closer to trial before entertaining a change of plea. Moreover, plea 
negotiations do not take place in a vacuum; they take place during 
oral and written communications between the prosecutor and defense 
counsel. If during plea bargaining the defense counsel specifically asks 
the prosecutor about the presence or absence of impeachment 
evidence, then rules pertaining to candor already prohibit the 
prosecutor from engaging in misrepresentation.199 
In addition to these conceptual problems with the accuracy 
argument, there are serious pragmatic obstacles to mandating 
enhanced disclosure of impeachment information at the guilty plea 
 
 197. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630–31 (2002) (recognizing that the extent to which 
preplea impeachment disclosure helps a defendant depends on the defendant’s independent 
knowledge of the prosecution’s case). 
 198. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (holding that guarantee of 
effective assistance of counsel under Sixth Amendment encompasses defense attorney’s 
obligation to conduct reasonable investigation of facts); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1484 (2010) (explaining that, when considering motions for post-conviction relief after 
guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no relevant distinction 
between acts of omission or commission of defense counsel for purposes of Strickland analysis). 
 199. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d), R. 4.1 (1983). 
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stage of criminal proceedings. In my view, these implementation 
problems collectively outweigh the accuracy concerns voiced by 
McMunigal, Prosser, and others. Some but not all of these obstacles 
were identified by the Supreme Court in Ruiz, where the Court quite 
appropriately recognized that due process analysis allows courts to 
weigh the nature of the private interest at stake against any adverse 
impact or costs imposed upon the government and the public interest 
by increased disclosure.200 
First, requiring the disclosure of impeachment information 
before a guilty plea poses a serious timing problem. Evidence is only 
impeaching if it can be used to undercut the credibility of a 
government witness or exhibit. Especially for plea bargaining 
discussions that occur soon after arraignment, before any concerted 
trial preparation has begun, the government may not know whom it 
will call as a witness at trial and what exhibits it will introduce. 
Professor Douglass properly refers to that as a “matching” problem.201 
The matching problem is highlighted in Scenario 2 in Part II above. If 
there are a number of eyewitnesses to an armed robbery and not all of 
them will testify, evidence of intoxication that is impeaching as to one 
observer but not others would not be subject to disclosure under Brady 
and not admissible at trial unless that particular bystander is called 
by the government as a witness. Similarly, in Scenario 3, the 
government may attempt to prove the bank fraud without calling the 
lead case agent who packaged the referral for prosecution. This may 
be possible if other investigators worked on the case or if important 
documentary evidence is admissible as a business or public record 
without authentication from the lead agent. In that situation, the 
contents of the agent’s personnel file and the ongoing internal affairs 
investigation would likely be inadmissible.202 
Second, requiring disclosure of all impeachment evidence prior 
to a guilty plea would cause a delay in criminal proceedings while 
prosecutors comb their files and the files of investigative officers 
 
 200. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. 
 201. Douglass, supra note 36, at 497–98 (pre-Ruiz discussion concluding that Brady doctrine 
is ill-suited to guilty plea situations, and should be left to its original purpose of assuring a fair 
trial). 
 202. While it is true that in many jurisdictions a defendant may impeach his own witness, 
see FED. R. EVID. 602, and thus could conceivably call the lead agent for the primary purpose of 
getting impeachment evidence in front of the jury, as a matter of discovery rather than 
permissible trial strategy, the Brady/Giglio line of cases does not require the government to 
assist the defense by disclosing impeachment information for defense witnesses See, e.g., United 
States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 
1285 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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attempting to identify impeachment information. Typically it is the 
process of trial preparation (carefully scrutinizing witness statements 
and police reports, preparing exhibits, re-interviewing witnesses, etc.) 
that prompts prosecutors to notice discrepancies that could be used for 
impeachment purposes. It takes considerable skill and effort to extract 
impeachment information from case agents,203 as reflected in Scenario 
1, where not all of the alleged rape victim’s inconsistent statements 
were reduced to writing. This is particularly true in complex white 
collar cases that may involve parallel civil and criminal proceedings 
and multiple indictments involving sequential violent crimes (e.g., 
serial rapes or murders) that may cross several jurisdictions and 
involve more than one police department. A rule of criminal procedure 
or ethics that required disclosure of all impeachment information 
before a guilty plea (especially if it is nonwaivable) would require 
prosecutors to conduct an exhaustive review of government files before 
disposing of any case to make sure that everything conceivably 
impeaching has been turned over. Criminal cases would take longer to 
resolve, and prosecutors would be capable of handling fewer cases, 
undercutting the primary efficiency rationale for plea bargaining. 
These delays might actually end up hurting criminal defendants more 
than they are helped by a rule of preplea disclosure. Since one of the 
government’s primary motivations for plea bargaining is resource 
preservation, a prosecutor might offer less favorable sentencing 
recommendations to defendants once the functional equivalent of trial 
preparation has occurred.204 Moreover, if pretrial proceedings take 
longer from arraignment to disposition, then defendants held in 
custody awaiting trial will be adversely affected, particularly where 
the ultimate disposition pursuant to a plea bargain is a suspended 
sentence or “time served.”205 
Third, requiring disclosure of impeachment information before 
a guilty plea does not reflect the reality of criminal justice practice in 
very busy state courts, particularly with respect to the handling of 
routine misdemeanors and low-level felonies. Those who advocate for 
enhanced disclosures seem to focus primarily on federal court practice, 
where Assistant U.S. Attorneys often work closely with case agents on 
criminal investigations and spend substantial time interviewing 
critical witnesses in the presence of those agents. In those situations, 
 
 203. Green, supra note 6, at 2179. 
 204. See Covey, supra note 184, at 74. Under the trial shadow theory of plea bargaining, a 
rational prosecutor will discount the likely sentence after trial by the likelihood of acquittal and 
the costs associated with preparing and trying the case.  
 205. Douglass, supra note 36, at 448 n.43. 
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prosecutors may have more knowledge of and access to impeachment 
information. However, for routine misdemeanors in state court, guilty 
pleas with little or no investigation or discovery beyond an arresting 
officer’s police report and a booking sheet are often the norm.206 Given 
high caseload volume, prosecutors might not have an opportunity to 
speak with victims or police officers before a guilty plea other than in 
a busy corridor of the courthouse at or near arraignment.207 If they do, 
then they may not have an opportunity to commit these conversations 
to writing for their files. Staff turnover, reassignment, or horizontal 
prosecution systems might mean that more than one prosecutor is 
involved in a case from screening to disposition. In those situations, 
information obtained by one prosecutor may not be communicated 
adequately to another, or if it is, it may not have been adequately 
documented. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that low-level 
criminal charges are frequently handled by the most junior and 
inexperienced lawyers. Whereas case volume might prevent 
prosecutors from having time to review their files thoroughly before a 
change of plea, inexperience might prevent them from even 
recognizing the significance of certain impeachment information if 
they see it. 
Finally, plea agreements that are entered into prior to the 
completion of discovery often promote witness privacy and safety. 
Mandating preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence might require 
prosecutors to reveal the identity of undercover operatives and 
cooperating witnesses very soon after arraignment, thus risking their 
physical safety, exposing them to tampering and intimidation, and 
undermining their ability to continue to work with the government on 
other pending investigations.208 Presently, federal prosecutors seek to 
protect these security interests either by delaying disclosure of 
witness identity and statements until immediately before trial209 or by 
 
 206. See Prosser, supra note 34, at 555. 
 207. See Blasser et al., supra note 38, at 1981. 
 208. It is for this reason that some states do not require the government to disclose the list of 
witnesses it plans to call until a specified number of days before trial. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 1054.1(a), 1054.7 (prosecuting attorney must produce witness list no fewer than thirty days 
before trial); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 12.3(a)(2) (attorney general must produce witness list no 
fewer than twenty days before trial). 
 209. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, unlike the criminal discovery rules in many jurisdictions, does not 
require the government to turn over a list of witnesses prior to trial. Although the Jencks Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3500, allows a prosecutor to turn over witness statements immediately after that 
witness has testified on direct examination, as a practical matter most federal prosecutors turn 
over Jencks material within a reasonable time before trial, often as part of an agreed-upon 
discovery order. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing 
Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 671 (1999). 
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seeking a protective order under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(d). The Jencks Act210 was intended to mediate the tension between 
witness safety and the disclosure of sufficient evidence to allow the 
defendant to prepare for trial.211 A rule requiring disclosure of 
impeachment evidence before a guilty plea would undercut this 
legislative accommodation, because in most instances it is impossible 
to disclose impeachment material without giving away the identity of 
the witness whom it impeaches.212 
Impeachment information may also be included in the school 
records, employment records, and medical records of victims or 
witnesses. If all such impeachment information were required to be 
disclosed prior to a guilty plea, then the government’s ability to 
protect those witnesses from embarrassing personal revelations would 
vanish. In the long run, the diminished protection could discourage 
victims from reporting crime. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act grants 
victims the right “to be reasonably protected from the accused”213 and 
the right to be treated “with respect for [their] dignity and privacy”214 
and requires prosecutors to use their “best efforts” to protect these 
rights.215 A broad construction of Model Rule 3.8(d) would be 
inconsistent with the purpose—if not the explicit requirements—of 
that Act. 
Returning to our hypotheticals, imagine an alleged instance of 
acquaintance rape of the sort described in Scenario 1. In addition to 
the prior inconsistent statements of the victim, assume that the 
government has information that the victim in question made an 
allegation of child sexual abuse against her stepfather when she was 
twelve years old that was later withdrawn. Arguably this is 
impeachment evidence that could be used at trial under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 608(b) or its state equivalent and is therefore subject to 
 
 210. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006). 
 211. See United States v Bobadilla-Lopez, 954 F.2d 519, 521 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 212. See United States v. Colacurcio, No. CR-09-209TAJ, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2010) 
(ruling that a Washington state ethical rule requiring a prosecutor to make “timely” disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to the accused did not override the Jencks act by operation of the McDade 
Amendment, and that in any event, disclosure of witness statements eight weeks before trial was 
timely for purposes of state ethics rule). The court recognized in Colacurcio that “[i]n general, it 
will be difficult at best to extract ‘information’ from a witness statement without revealing the 
witness’s identity or at least giving substantial clues as to the witness’s identity.” Id. 
 213. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (2006). 
 214. § 3771(a)(8). 
 215. § 3771(c).  
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disclosure before trial under Brady.216 Let us further assume that the 
co-employee in the date rape case is willing to plead guilty to a lesser 
included offense of indecent assault and battery in exchange for the 
prosecutor’s recommendation of a suspended sentence and probation. 
Many prosecutors would prefer to avoid a very difficult Brady issue 
while at the same time protecting the victim’s privacy by entering into 
a plea bargain. A rule that requires disclosure of all impeaching 
material before a guilty plea, without the capacity for waiver, would 
effectively preclude such a pragmatic calculus. It would also conflict 
with many child abuse protection217 and rape counseling privilege 
statutes218 across the country that treat such information as 
confidential and not subject to disclosure except by following a 
rigorous protocol, such as motion, threshold showing, and in camera 
judicial inspection.219 Similar privacy concerns have motivated some 
states to enact police protection statutes,220 which preclude 
prosecutors from turning over impeachment information contained in 
law enforcement personnel files except upon motion of the defendant 
establishing grounds and materiality (as in Scenario 3). 
Advocates of more fulsome preplea disclosure undoubtedly will 
argue that the witness privacy and safety interests I have identified 
 
 216. See State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737, 752–53 (Wis. 2004). Whether a prior withdrawn 
allegation of sexual assault can be used to impeach an alleged rape victim will depend on the 
particular context of the case and the contours of the state’s rape shield statute. The allegation of 
child abuse may have been withdrawn because it was insincere or inaccurate, or it may have 
been withdrawn because family members or medical professionals caring for the victim did not 
wish to expose her to further trauma or intimidation. See Dennis v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 
466, 472 (Ky. 2010) (under Kentucky’s rape shield rule, evidence concerning an alleged victim’s 
prior allegation of sexual impropriety is not admissible unless the proponent establishes at a 
pretrial hearing that the accusation was demonstrably false); State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 
321 (N.J. 2004) (collecting cases). 
 217. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 n.17 (1987) (recognizing that all fifty states 
have enacted statutes providing in some fashion for the confidentiality of state records of child 
abuse investigations, and reconciling a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial under the 
Fourteenth Amendment with this statutory privilege by remanding for in camera judicial review 
to determine what information was material to the defense).  
 218. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802.1(d) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20J 
(2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4510(b) (MCKINNEY 2007). 
 219. See Tera Jackowski Peterson, Distrust and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in 
Discovery of Rape Victim’s Counseling Records in Utah, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 695, 705–06 (2001) 
(explaining that, after Ritchie, procedures governing disclosure of counseling records of rape 
victims “vary widely”); see also Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418 (Mass. 2006) 
(“Before ordering that a summons issue for [presumptively privileged] records, [a] judge . . . must 
evaluate whether the . . . requirements of relevance, admissibility, necessity, and specificity have 
been met . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 220. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (West 2008); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a 
(MCKINNEY 2009). 
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can best be accommodated by protective orders of the court and that 
we should entrust such determinations to neutral judges rather than 
to the unchecked discretion of adversarial prosecutors. For example, 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 allows a prosecutor to submit 
potentially discoverable material to the court for in camera inspection 
and request an order denying, restricting, or deferring disclosure.221 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) similarly creates an exception for a 
prosecutor’s disclosure obligations “when the prosecutor is relieved of 
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.”222 But 
requiring the prosecutor to seek a protective order to protect the 
privacy and safety interests of victims, witnesses, and undercover 
operatives—even when the defendant intends to plead guilty—creates 
further steps in the litigation, causes delays, and imposes resource 
costs on the courts, undermining several of the primary efficiency 
rationales for plea bargaining. Given the limited resources of many 
prosecutors’ offices and the pressure on them to move cases—
especially in busy urban state courts—it is simply impractical to 
expect them to seek protective orders at the very early stage of every 
criminal case where the safety and privacy interests of witnesses may 
be implicated, especially when they have received every indication 
that the defendant intends to plead guilty.223 
With these significant obstacles in mind, let us now return to 
Professor McMunigal’s “accuracy” argument in favor of preplea 
impeachment disclosures. I concede that the pressures on defendants 
to plead guilty in the U.S. criminal justice system are enormous224 and 
that innocent defendants sometimes plead guilty.225 They may do so to 
protect loved ones, to avoid harsh sentencing schemes enacted by the 
legislature, to avoid trial if they distrust the ability of their counsel to 
represent them effectively, or to avoid outcome uncertainty due to the 
information deficits as to their own guilt or innocence that McMunigal 
and others describe. In my view, the proper way to improve the 
 
 221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) also allows 
the government to move for a protective order to protect against the disclosure of any classified 
information that might pose a harm to national security. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1, 3 (2006). 
 222. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983). 
 223. Blasser et al., supra note 38, at 1969 (noting disagreement among members of the 
discovery working group as to whether protective orders are feasible given the limited resources 
of many prosecutors’ offices). 
 224. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750–51 (1970); see Albert Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 58 (1968). 
 225. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 536 (2005) (a study of defendants later exonerated through DNA 
evidence showed that six percent of them had pleaded guilty). 
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accuracy of guilty pleas is to repeal (or at least curtail the expansion 
of) harsh mandatory-minimum penalties,226 reduce the huge disparity 
in sentences between those who plead guilty and those who are 
convicted at trial,227 improve the investigative and trial resources 
available to counsel for the indigent,228 and prohibit prosecutors from 
threatening to prosecute loved ones to obtain leverage over a 
defendant.229 Courts should also require disclosure of all “core” or 
“classic” Brady material prior to a guilty plea and be unwilling to 
accept any plea agreement containing a waiver of access to evidence 
that supports factual innocence.230 With each of these inequities 
addressed, defendants in doubt about their guilt or innocence will feel 
less constrained to plead guilty and more empowered to proceed to 
trial (prior to which impeachment disclosures will be made by the 
prosecutor under Giglio). Starting with impeachment disclosures as a 
way to attack the accuracy problem is like performing surgery with a 
sledgehammer; it creates all of the problems I identified above while 
ignoring some of the most troublesome sources of injustice in our 
criminal justice system. 
In fact, mandating preplea disclosure of impeachment 
information might turn out primarily to benefit guilty defendants, who 
will either (1) be provided with a strategic advantage during the plea 
bargaining in terms of leveraging a more favorable deal or (2) due to 
the excessive baggage carried by government witnesses, be more 
willing to roll the dice and proceed to trial notwithstanding their 
factual guilt. Defendants who prey on victims with troubled histories, 
through either fortuity or guile, may fare better in our plea bargaining 
system than those who victimize the strong and the less vulnerable. 
Neither the retributive nor the deterrent aims of our criminal justice 
system are furthered by such a perverse result. 
 
 226. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2468, 2486–87 (identifying structural impediments that distort plea bargaining, including 
mandatory minimum sentences). 
 227. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis 
of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 552–53 (1997) (advocating for enhancing legitimacy 
of plea bargaining by improving Rule 11 colloquies and reducing prosecutors’ sentencing 
leverage). 
 228. See Babcock, supra note 131, at 1174 (arguing for more public defenders, increased 
support for them, and a greater commitment by the private bar to pro bono work). 
 229. See R. Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An Essay in 
Honor of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 105 (2011) (condemning such practice as 
highly coercive).  
 230. See supra note 68 and cases cited. 
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V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS GOING FORWARD 
There appear to be at least three obvious solutions to the 
question of how much impeachment evidence should be disclosed by a 
prosecutor before a guilty plea. First, the rules of criminal procedure 
might not require the disclosure of any impeachment information 
before allocution (the Ruiz approach). Another possibility is to require 
disclosure of impeachment information that is so important and 
potentially significant to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty that 
the evidence is considered “material.” A third possibility would be to 
require disclosure of all impeachment information known to the 
prosecutor (the stance arguably taken by ABA Formal Opinion 09-454 
and the 2003 ACTL proposal to amend Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16). Yet each of these resolutions is unsatisfactory, which is 
precisely why the problem of impeachment disclosures has thus far 
presented itself as so intractable. 
For the reasons described above, requiring disclosure of all 
impeachment information without regard to materiality is unwise and 
unworkable. In a domestic violence case where the victim confides in 
the prosecutor in the courtroom corridor, “I told my boss I was sick 
today because I was too embarrassed to tell him that I was coming to 
court,” that prosecutor would have to turn that statement over to the 
defendant as evidence of a prior act of dishonesty.231 For good reason, 
Brady does not require that the government deliver its entire file to 
defense counsel232 or “divulge every possible shred of evidence that 
could conceivably benefit the defendant.”233 The world is too vast and 
hindsight bias is too strong. 
Even the move to “open file” discovery undertaken by a limited 
number of jurisdictions234 will not eliminate the impeachment 
conundrum. First, open file discovery presupposes that the prosecutor 
 
 231. Other complications ensue. If the prosecutor was the only witness to the statement, she 
risks being disqualified from representing the state should the case proceed to trial. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (1983); see also In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1169 (Colo. 
2002). If the prosecutor anticipates that risk and brings another witness into the conversation, 
such as a victim witness advocate or police officer, that agent then must undertake the 
additional burden of memorializing the conversation in writing so that it can be accurately 
disclosed to the defense. 
 232. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (“[T]he prosecutor is not required to 
deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused 
that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”). 
 233. United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 234. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (2010); E.D. Wisc. Crim. R. 16. See generally 
Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to Disbarment of Mike Nifong: 
The Critical Importance of Open File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008). 
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will turn over documents and tangible evidence contained in his file; it 
does not capture situations where the victim or another witness has 
told the prosecutor or police officer something orally that has not been 
reduced to writing, as in Scenario 4 above. Moreover, open file 
discovery policies typically do not specify what documents in the 
possession of other government agencies must be transmitted to the 
prosecutor’s office, as in Scenario 3, with regard to impeachment 
material contained in an agent’s personnel file. While an open file 
approach to discovery might be intuitively appealing due to its 
simplicity, it fails to capture the complexities of many real-life 
impeachment scenarios. 
The tensions I identify above seem to cry out for a middle 
ground solution. One possibility is a renewed focus on materiality.235 
Although both the ABA in Formal Opinion 09-454 and the advocates 
of Rule 16 reform have advocated abandoning materiality as a 
touchstone for a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations with respect to 
classically exculpatory evidence, perhaps jurisdictions should retain it 
as the litmus test for when impeachment information needs to be 
turned over by the prosecutor prior to a guilty plea. The problem with 
this approach is that materiality—already decried as an unworkable 
framework to guide prosecutorial disclosure obligations236—is even 
more vague and indefinite with regard to impeachment evidence than 
it is with regard to classically exculpatory information.237 
Identification procedures that suggest someone else committed the 
 
 235. Notwithstanding Ruiz, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has interpreted that state’s 
pertinent rule of criminal procedure to require a prosecutor, upon request, to turn over material 
impeaching information prior to a guilty plea, at least where the change of plea occurs close to 
the scheduled trial date. See State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737, 755–56 (Wis. 2004) (affirming 
allowance of motion to withdraw guilty plea where prosecutor failed to turn over in child sexual 
assault prosecution other pending accusation by victim against grandfather, because other 
incident might have been used to show sexual knowledge by youthful victim). The court in Harris 
was interpreting WIS. STAT. § 971.23, which required the disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
“within a reasonable time before trial.” Id. at 755. 
 236. See Burke, supra note 37, at 509 (noting that after 45 years of Brady jurisprudence 
there are very few useful guidelines for prosecutors about materiality). 
 237. Eleven years ago, the Ethics 2000 Commission proposed to amend the comments to 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) to require prosecutors to disclose evidence that 
“materially tends to impeach” a government witness. This comment would have added a 
materiality element for impeachment material, even though as discussed above materiality 
arguably is not a precondition for the ethical obligation to disclose classically exculpatory 
evidence under the “tends to negate guilt” language of Rule 3.8(d). Nevertheless, the Department 
of Justice successfully opposed this revised comment due to the potential elasticity of the 
impeachment concept and the difficulty of predicting materiality in a pretrial context. See 
Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the 
Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 469 (2002); see also Kuckes, supra note 119, 
at 439. 
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crime, evidence from other eyewitnesses that exculpate the defendant, 
or forensic test results inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt are 
easier to spot as material in the sense that they could affect a jury’s 
determination of guilt or innocence. The significance of impeachment 
evidence, because it is so contextualized in terms of what affirmative 
evidence it undermines and how convincingly it does so, is far more 
difficult to assess.238 In the absence of reciprocal discovery from the 
defendant, the prosecutor may not know what shape the defense will 
take and what elements of the crime will be in dispute.239 A 
materiality approach also raises the difficult conceptual question of 
“material to what?” Is the prosecutor supposed to forecast the likely 
effect of the impeachment evidence on a trial if one were to occur, or 
the likely effect of the impeachment evidence on the defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty?240 The former might be too far away at the 
time of plea discussions to assess with accuracy before the prosecutor 
determines which witnesses are likely to be called and what physical 
evidence will be introduced. The latter requires the prosecutor to 
speculate about the impact of the information on a defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty, which of course will vary depending on the 
defendant’s degree of risk aversion.241 If the death of Nicholas Marsh, 
Stevens’s former prosecutor,242 teaches us anything, it is that 
prosecutors need more concrete guidance and direction with regard to 
impeachment evidence than a vague “materiality” standard can 
provide. 
 
 238. This is why Lanny Breuer, on behalf of the Department of Justice, opposed the most 
recent proposal to amend Rule 16 to require disclosure of information that casts “substantial 
doubt” upon the testimony of any witness, suggesting that codifying that standard would prompt 
“decades of litigation” to unpack its meaning. See supra note 111.  
 239. Burke, supra note 40, at 2125 (arguing that a lack or failure of reciprocal discovery can 
also impair Brady disclosures because “the prosecutor may not realize that a piece of evidence is 
favorable to the defense if she does not know the defense’s theory of the case”); see, e.g., FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 12.1 (requiring notice of alibi defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (requiring notice of insanity 
defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3 (requiring notice of public authority defense). 
 240. See Douglass, supra note 36, at 472–74 (discussing the effect on, and application of, 
Brady’s materiality standard on guilty pleas); Hashimoto, supra note 186, at 955 (noting that 
with respect to nondisclosure of evidence that supports factual innocence, courts since Ruiz have 
been inquiring whether there is a reasonable probability that it would have affected the 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty). 
 241. Even if a court takes an objective approach and asks whether the disclosure of the 
withheld evidence would have caused a reasonable defendant to elect to proceed to trial, that 
task is still exceptionally difficult. See Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(“While this checklist is useful, experience teaches that each defendant's decision as to whether 
or not to enter a guilty plea is personal and, thus, unique. Consequently, the compendium of 
relevant factors and the comparative weight given to each will vary from case to case.”). 
 242. Toobin, supra note 1, at 39. 
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Right now, local federal rules vary greatly on the subject of 
Brady and Giglio disclosures.243 Some district rules, similar to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, say nothing about exculpatory 
evidence and leave that requirement to enforcement of constitutional 
norms.244 Other districts expressly incorporate Brady and Giglio by 
reference.245 Still other districts have begun to distinguish in their 
local rules between evidence that is exculpatory because it supports 
factual innocence and evidence that is exculpatory because it is 
impeaching, requiring the disclosure of the former a certain number of 
days following arraignment and the latter a certain number of days 
before trial (similar to the 2006 proposal submitted by the Advisory 
Committee to the Standing Committee).246 Finally, some jurisdictions 
have followed the 2003 ACTL suggestion (now resurrected by Judge 
Emmet Sullivan) by requiring disclosure of all favorable evidence 
without regard to materiality and without distinguishing between 
classically exculpatory and impeaching information.247 Given that over 
ninety percent of criminal cases in federal court are resolved by a 
guilty plea,248 one nettlesome question this landscape presents is 
whether such a huge disparity in practice across the federal districts 
is acceptable. 
State rules of criminal procedure also vary widely in their 
approach to the disclosure of impeachment evidence, although they 
tend to be even less evolved than the local federal rules.249 A minority 
of states have narrow rules like Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16 that make no explicit reference at all to exculpatory evidence and 
therefore leave that obligation to judicial construction of due process 
 
 243. See HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 76, at 25–38 (providing a district by district 
comparison). 
 244. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. LOC. R. 16.1; D. WYO. CRIM. R. 16.1. 
 245. See, e.g., N.D.N.Y. R. Crim. P. 14.1(b)(2); M.D. TENN. CRIM. R. 16.01(a)(2)(d). 
 246. D. HAW. CRIM. R. 16.1(a)(7), (g)(2) (requiring disclosure of Brady material seven days 
after arraignment, and impeachment material “as ordered by the court”); N.D.N.Y. R. CRIM. P. 
14.1(b)(2), (d)(1) (requiring disclosure of Brady material fourteen days after arraignment and 
Giglio material fourteen days prior to trial); D. VT. CR. R. 16(a)(2), (d)(1) (requiring disclosure of 
Brady material fourteen days after arraignment and Giglio material fourteen days prior to jury 
selection). 
 247. S.D. ALA. R. 16.13(b)(1)(B) (requiring disclosure of all information “favorable to the 
defendant . . . without regard to materiality”); S.D. GA. CRIM. R. 16.1(f) (requiring disclosure of 
“any evidence favorable to the defendant” within seven days of arraignment). 
 248. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 741 (2010). 
 249. See Prosser, supra note 34, at 577 (providing an overview of jurisdictional variations). 
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requirements.250 Most states incorporate the constitutional 
requirements of Brady/Giglio in their criminal discovery rules, either 
explicitly251 or implicitly, by using terms such as “exculpatory 
evidence,”252 information “favorable” to the accused,253 or evidence that 
“tends to negate” guilt,254 with notes in their commentaries linking the 
obligation to Brady and thereby implicitly incorporating a materiality 
element. My research revealed no state jurisdiction that explicitly 
distinguishes between disclosure of exculpatory evidence before trial 
or before a guilty plea: in some states, the timing of disclosures is left 
vague with words such as “timely,” “as soon as practicable,” or “within 
a reasonable time before trial,”255 while in other states disclosure is 
required a specified number of days after request.256 California has the 
narrowest disclosure rules. As a result of Proposition 115, California 
Penal Code section 1054 requires prosecutors to disclose an extensive 
list of matters to the defendant, including “exculpatory evidence.”257 
However, section 1054.7 provides that these disclosures need only be 
made thirty days before trial.258 Two of the primary goals of the 
referendum were to simplify criminal litigation and to protect 
witnesses from harassment or intimidation.259 
While some state rules require disclosure of certain types of 
impeachment information,260 only one state appears to generally 
reference all “impeachment” evidence in its criminal discovery rules. 
Maryland differentiates when impeachment information must be 
disclosed to the defendant based on seriousness of offense and court of 
jurisdiction. In practice before the district courts of Maryland, the 
prosecutor must disclose before trial all evidence and information that 
 
 250. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to 
Investigate, and Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1099, 1123 
(2004) (providing an overview of jurisdictional variations). 
 251. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 98(A)(2)(iv); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16, advisory commission comment. 
 252. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1)(h) 
(West 2008); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 253. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 718(1); OHIO CRIM. R. 16(B)(1)(5). 
 254. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01(6). 
 255. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c), (d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1)(h). 
 256. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.1(c)(1); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(3). 
 257. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2011). 
 258. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7. 
 259. Berend, supra note 189, at 495 n.105. 
 260. Massachusetts requires disclosure of “promises, rewards or inducements” made to 
Commonwealth witnesses, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(ix). Illinois requires disclosure of “any 
record of prior criminal convictions” of persons whom the state intends to call as witnesses. ILL. 
SUP. CT. R. 412(a)(vi). 
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“tends to impeach a State’s witness.”261 No preplea disclosure of 
impeachment material is required, provided that the change of plea 
occurs before the start of trial. However, for felonies prosecuted in the 
circuit courts of Maryland, the rule is quite different. The prosecutor 
must disclose without request and within thirty days after the 
defendant’s first appearance “all material or information in any form, 
whether or not admissible, that tends to impeach a State’s witness.”262 
The term “tends to impeach” is defined to include seven specific 
subcategories of information.263 Maryland thus takes a rather 
schizophrenic approach, requiring either the disclosure of all 
impeachment information or no impeachment information before a 
guilty plea (absent waiver), depending on the seriousness of the 
offense. 
Clearly jurisdictions are struggling with this issue.264 Yet, 
unlike Goldilocks testing out the beds in the house of the three bears, 
 
 261. MD. R. 4-262(d)(1). 
262. Id. 
 263. See MD. R. 4-263(d)(6)(A)–(G) (including prior conduct of untruthfulness, agreements, or 
understandings to induce testimony, prior criminal convictions, and pending charges against 
witness, prior materially inconsistent statements, medical or psychiatric condition that may 
impair the witness’s ability to testify truthfully and accurately, the fact that the witness has 
taken but did not pass a polygraph, and the failure of the witness to identify the defendant or a 
codefendant). 
 264. Another committee of the American Bar Association, the Standards Committee of the 
Criminal Justice Section, is presently in the process of drafting a fourth edition of the Standards 
on Administration of Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions (latest available 
draft, Summer 2010). Their work is only in draft form, and has not yet been approved by the 
ABA. See Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS. L.J. 1111 (2011) (draft standards available at 
appendix). The Criminal Justice Standards Committee has encountered the same tensions and 
difficulties with regard to preplea impeachment disclosures as those identified in this article. 
The proposal as presently drafted distinguishes between disclosure obligations before trial, id. at 
1147 (Proposed Standard 3-5.5), and disclosure obligations before a guilty plea, id. at 1148–49 
(Proposed Standard 3-5.7 (e)). For disclosure obligations before trial, the Standards Committee 
recommends specifically adding reference to information that “impeaches the government’s 
witnesses or evidence.” Id. at 1147 (Proposed Standard 3-5.5(a)). It also expressly dispenses with 
the materiality element of Brady, by requiring pretrial disclosure “regardless of whether the 
prosecution thinks it will change the result of the proceeding.” Id. (Proposed Standard 3-5.5(c)). 
Thus, according to these draft standards, all impeachment evidence must be turned over before 
trial. But in the case of plea bargains, the Committee reverts to the bald “tends to negate guilt” 
language of the old standard, thereby preserving the “materiality” ambiguity. All evidence 
“tending to negate guilt” should optimally be turned over before a guilty plea, although a 
prosecutor “on an individualized basis [may] seek and accept a knowing and voluntary waiver.” 
Id. at 1149 (Proposed Standard 3-5.7(e), (f)). Even in that event, however, the “prosecutor should 
always disclose evidence known to the prosecutor that directly suggests the defendant is 
innocent.” Id. (Proposed Standard 3-5.7(f)). On the difficult issue of preplea disclosure of 
impeachment information, therefore, the Standards Committee has essentially “punted.” Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1341 (2011) (“This 
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none of the approaches identified above seem to fit quite right. 
Certainly the solution that is the clearest, the easiest to apply, the 
most efficient, and the most protective of witness privacy is to require 
no impeachment disclosures whatsoever before a guilty plea. But is 
that fair to defendants? Two particular forms of impeachment 
material strike me as serious enough to potentially undermine our 
confidence in the voluntariness and accuracy of a guilty plea. One is a 
witness’s inability or failure to identify the defendant from an 
identification procedure (e.g., photo array, lineup, etc.).265 In a case 
that hinges on identification, the failure of a witness to identify the 
defendant when given an opportunity to do so is perhaps the most 
damaging form of impeachment imaginable, bordering on the factually 
exculpatory. The other powerful form of impeachment evidence is 
promises, rewards, and inducements given to a government witness.266 
This evidence may be critical not only to show a motive by the witness 
to fabricate, but also to allow the defendant to assess whether the 
actions of the cooperating witness during the investigation are 
attributable to the government for purposes of raising a possible 
entrapment defense.267 While experienced defense counsel typically 
move for disclosure of these two forms of impeachment evidence 
during discovery,268 making such disclosure automatic prior to a guilty 
plea (absent a protective order or waiver) may serve the collateral 
purpose of helping to insulate convictions from later attack on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
These observations lead me to conclude that if any changes are 
contemplated in this area, the rules of criminal procedure might be 
amended to require the disclosure of certain categories of 
impeachment information prior to a guilty plea, on the presumption 
that more often than not those categories of impeachment evidence 
 
leaves unresolved the debate over whether impeachment evidence should be revealed prior to 
entry of a guilty plea.”). 
 265. See State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396, 398 (La. 1980) (explaining that the sole eyewitness’s 
failure to identify the defendant from earlier photo array was materially impeaching of 
eyewitness’s later in-court identification because “[in court] identification was the most 
important and key evidence presented against defendant, and his reliability would have been a 
crucial factor in the jury’s determination of defendant’s guilt”). 
 266. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, 
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129 (2004). 
 267. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (1957) (explaining the importance of such 
evidence). 
 268. See, e.g., JACK B. HOOD & HERBERT H. HENRY II, ALABAMA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE 
FORMS § 16:3(II)(20)(I), (M) (2010) (including as part of a discovery template requests for 
information relating to the misidentification of the defendant and promises made to witnesses); 
OHIO CRIMINAL DEFENSE MOTIONS F 2:6 (2008) (same). 
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are critical to a defendant’s decision whether to plead guilty or to 
proceed to trial. The U.S. District Court in Massachusetts has adopted 
such a categorical approach in its local rules. This court distinguishes 
between information that must be automatically disclosed by the 
prosecutor (absent waiver) twenty-eight days after arraignment and 
information that must be disclosed twenty-one days before trial.269 
Four particular types of impeachment information are considered so-
called “twenty-eight day” material: promises, rewards, and 
inducements to prospective government witnesses; the prior criminal 
record of prospective government witnesses; pending criminal charges 
against prospective government witnesses; and a written description 
of the failure of any percipient witness to identify the defendant 
during an identification procedure.270 Other common forms of 
impeachment information are included in the list of “twenty-one day” 
material, which may be withheld until shortly before trial. These 
include prior inconsistent statements of government witnesses; 
information revealing a bias or prejudice of the witness against the 
defendant; a written description of any prior acts of dishonesty of the 
witness that may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 
608(b); and information known to the government of any mental or 
physical impairment of the witness that may cast doubt on the ability 
of the witness to testify accurately and truthfully.271 The practical 
result of this bifurcated approach is to require disclosure of what the 
court felt were the most important and damaging forms of 
impeachment information prior to a guilty plea but to authorize the 
government to delay other impeachment disclosures (particularly 
those that would embarrass or invade the privacy of witnesses) until 
shortly before trial.272 
Jurisdictions inclined to follow a categorical approach might 
consider including in the early discovery category substantial 
inconsistencies between a witness’s versions of events on key elements 
 
 269. D. MASS. R. 116.2(B)(1), (2). 
 270. Id. at R. 116.2(B)(1)(b)–(f). 
 271. Id. at R. 116.2(B)(2)(b)–(g). This latter list is not exclusive, as Rule 116.2(B)(2)(a) 
requires disclosure before trial of any information that “tends to cast doubt” on the credibility or 
accuracy of any witness. 
 272. The local federal rule in Massachusetts also contains a written declination procedure 
whereby the prosecutor can decline to produce certain information otherwise required by the 
local rule. If the defendant files a motion to compel, the court may examine the material in 
camera to determine whether any legitimate law enforcement interests (e.g., privacy, witness 
safety, national security, or the integrity of ongoing investigations) warrants withholding the 
material. Id. at R. 116.6(A). 
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of the government’s proof.273 While this category of Giglio information 
resurrects the troublesome concept of materiality, that concession may 
be necessary to capture instances where a victim’s recollection of 
events substantially changes over time.274 An example might highlight 
the difference in degree between varying forms of prior inconsistent 
statements. In my rape hypothetical above (Scenario 1 in Part II), a 
victim’s description of events that varies over time in minor detail 
(color of clothes, time of day, etc.) would be considered “twenty-one day 
material” under the local federal rule in Massachusetts and therefore 
such information would be subject to disclosure only before trial. But if 
that same witness gave conflicting accounts of other aspects of the 
alleged attack (use of contraceptives, number of instances or methods 
of penetration, etc.) those inconsistencies may be so central to the 
charged events as to seriously undermine the victim’s credibility, even 
if they are not factually exculpatory. In my view, conscientious 
prosecutors should disclose those inconsistencies prior to a guilty plea 
(absent an express waiver) even though in the District of 
Massachusetts they would still be considered “twenty-one day 
material” rather than “twenty-eight day material” because they do not 
“directly” negate the defendant’s guilt.275 
Let us return to the trial of Alaska Senator Ted Stevens on 
charges of knowingly failing to list on Senate disclosure forms 
approximately $250,000 in gifts and home renovations to a vacation 
home in Alaska. Two of the damaging pieces of information that the 
government withheld in that case were contained in notes from 
prosecutors’ pretrial interview with Bill Allen, a construction company 
executive and friend of Stevens with close ties to the oil industry who 
had agreed to cooperate with the government after being indicted for 
bribing state legislators in Alaska.276 During that interview 
 
 273. The Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure require the prosecutor in circuit court cases 
to disclose within thirty days of the defendant’s first appearance “an oral statement of the 
witness, not otherwise memorialized, that is materially inconsistent with another statement 
made by the witness or with a statement made by another witness.” MD. R. 4-263(d)(6)(D) 
(emphasis added). The Local Rule of the United States District Court in Vermont defines Giglio 
material to include “the content of substantially inconsistent statements that a witness has 
made concerning issues material to guilt or punishment.” D. VT. R. 16.0(d)(1)(B). 
 274. The January 4, 2010, Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden to 
federal prosecutors encourages prosecutors to memorialize and disclose “material variances in a 
witness’s statements,” Main Memo, supra note 96, at 8–9, although the timing of these 
disclosures is left to the discretion of individual prosecutors and local district court rules. 
 275. See D. MASS. R. 116.2(B)(1)(a) (requiring disclosure within twenty-eight days of 
arraignment of “[i]nformation that would tend directly to negate the defendant's guilt concerning 
any count in the indictment or information”). 
 276. Toobin, supra note 1, at 43. 
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approximately five months before trial, Allen told prosecutors 
(contrary to his later trial testimony) that the value of the contracting 
services his company performed at the Girdwood chalet was only 
about $80,000 and that he did not remember Bill Persons (a Stevens 
emissary) telling Allen that the Senator did not want a bill, he was 
only asking for one to “cover himself.”277 Both of those statements 
were favorable to the defense because they directly impeached Bill 
Allen on central and damaging points of his trial testimony. The latter 
statement was particularly relevant because it undercut the 
government’s theory that a note written by Stevens to Allen during 
construction stating “you owe me a bill . . . [This] just has to be done 
right” was just a cover for the Senator to protect himself.278 The prior 
statements themselves were not directly exculpatory, however; the 
difference in value of the services ($250,000 or $80,000) does not 
suggest factual or legal innocence, and the inability of Allen to recall 
the Persons statement at the time of the interview, while impeaching 
of a later ability to do so, did not directly exculpate Senator Stevens on 
the issue of whether he knew that he had not fully paid for Allen’s 
services. The irony here is that Giglio requires the disclosure of these 
inconsistencies before trial, but Ruiz does not require the disclosure of 
them before a guilty plea. Even the Massachusetts local rule would 
not alter that result. Had Ted Stevens entered into a plea agreement 
containing a typical Ruiz waiver, he may never have learned of these 
inconsistencies—even in the District of Massachusetts. If the drafters 
of federal and state rules of criminal procedure opt to take a 
categorical approach to impeachment disclosures—in my view, the 
best available alternative if any amendment is undertaken—the 
vexatious question that they must confront is whether fundamental 
fairness requires the disclosure of material inconsistencies in the 
accounts of key witnesses prior to a guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I urge caution on the part of rulemakers with 
regard to mandating the disclosure of impeachment information 
before a guilty plea. Although impeachment information has the same 
constitutional stature as other forms of exculpatory evidence under 
 
 277. Neil A. Lewis, Dismissal for Stevens, but Question on ‘Innocent’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/us/politics/12stevens.html; see 
Transcript on Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Verdict at 13–14, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-
cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009). 
 278. Toobin, supra note 1, at 43–44. 
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Brady, treating it like other forms of evidence favorable to the accused 
at the plea bargaining stage of a criminal case presents unique 
dangers and obstacles. Professional conduct rules are a particularly 
poor vehicle for reform in this area because they tend to be written at 
such a high level of generality that they fail to provide concrete 
guidance to attorneys and because they are enforced so infrequently 
that they tend to be ignored. Due to the wide disparity in types of 
cases handled (simple misdemeanors to complex felonies) and the 
significant differences in the courts in which such crimes are 
prosecuted (state versus federal), this matter is better dealt with by 
individual jurisdictions in enacting rules of criminal procedure than 
by broad and mostly hortatory rules of prosecutorial ethics. A 
categorical approach to preplea impeachment disclosures is the most 
promising option for jurisdictions seeking to provide more fulsome 
discovery to defendants beyond Brady while at the same time 
protecting other important interests such as efficiency, witness safety, 
and victim privacy. 
 
